tcp timestamp vulnerability?

[Christian Brueffer]

On Thu, May 19, 2005 at 11:42:33AM +0200, Andre Oppermann wrote:
> Christian Brueffer wrote:
> > 
> > Hi,
> > 
> > has anyone taken a look at http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/637934?
> 
> sys/netinet/tcp_input.c Revision 1.270, Sun Apr 10 05:24:59 2005 UTC
>  (5 weeks, 4 days ago) by ps
>  Branch: MAIN
>  Changes since 1.269: +23 -3 lines
> 
>  - Tighten up the Timestamp checks to prevent a spoofed segment from
>    setting ts_recent to an arbitrary value, stopping further
>    communication between the two hosts.
>  - If the Echoed Timestamp is greater than the current time,
>    fall back to the non RFC 1323 RTT calculation.
> 
>  Submitted by:	Raja Mukerji (raja at moselle dot com)
>  Reviewed by:	Noritoshi Demizu, Mohan Srinivasan
> 

Thanks.  Since I got this from the Heise Newsticker I'll see if I can
get them to update their story.

- Christian

-- 
Christian Brueffer	chris at unixpages.org	brueffer at FreeBSD.org
GPG Key:	 http://people.freebsd.org/~brueffer/brueffer.key.asc
GPG Fingerprint: A5C8 2099 19FF AACA F41B  B29B 6C76 178C A0ED 982D
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 187 bytes
Desc: not available
Url : http://lists.freebsd.org/pipermail/freebsd-net/attachments/20050519/70f66955/attachment.bin