TrustedBSD Extensions Project

stanislav shalunov shalunov at att.com
Wed Apr 12 22:36:54 GMT 2000


> From: David Collier-Brown - Sun Canada <davecb at scot.canada.sun.com>
> 
> | What if your disk controller goes bad and decides to write a block of
> | TOP SECRET information onto CLASSIFIED hard drive once in every ten
> | thousand requests?
> 
> 	Actually the write never gets to the driver, having been
> 	caught up in the permissions module that all the open
> 	operations have to pass through.

No.  You ask to transfer this data to SCSI ID 3, block 45467.
The controller decides to write to SCSI ID 1, block 45467.

> 	That's a denial-of-service attack on the TCB, not the
> 	whole OS.

If the whole OS is unusuable (doesn't respond to user input),
I guess that makes it.

> 	H-P sells their firewalls hosted on a B1 OS, and 

Why would I buy anything from HP?  My organization doesn't require
Orange Book-certified systems.  If it did, I wouldn't be able to use
TrustedBSD if/when it was done.

> 	No, the colors merely serve to remind the user that they
> 	can't copy from SECRET to UNCLAS on Trusted Solaris...

I'm not talking about Solaris.  I'm talking about just one possible
way to implement the (silly) requirement.
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