PERFORCE change 110795 for review
Robert Watson
rwatson at FreeBSD.org
Fri Dec 1 04:59:03 PST 2006
http://perforce.freebsd.org/chv.cgi?CH=110795
Change 110795 by rwatson at rwatson_zoo on 2006/12/01 12:58:27
Revert branch-local changes in kern_priv.c.
Affected files ...
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/priv/sys/kern/kern_priv.c#5 integrate
Differences ...
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/priv/sys/kern/kern_priv.c#5 (text+ko) ====
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
- * $FreeBSD$
+ * $FreeBSD: src/sys/kern/kern_priv.c,v 1.1 2006/11/06 13:37:17 rwatson Exp $
*/
#include "opt_mac.h"
@@ -43,15 +43,13 @@
/*
* `suser_enabled' (which can be set by the security.bsd.suser_enabled
- * sysctl) determines whether the system 'super-user' policy is in effect.
- * If it is nonzero, an effective uid of 0 connotes special privilege,
+ * sysctl) determines whether the system 'super-user' policy is in effect. If
+ * it is nonzero, an effective uid of 0 connotes special privilege,
* overriding many mandatory and discretionary protections. If it is zero,
* uid 0 is offered no special privilege in the kernel security policy.
- * Setting it to zero may seriously impact the functionality of many
- * existing userland programs, and should not be done without careful
- * consideration of the consequences.
- *
- * XXXRW: Update this comment as needed.
+ * Setting it to zero may seriously impact the functionality of many existing
+ * userland programs, and should not be done without careful consideration of
+ * the consequences.
*/
int suser_enabled = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, suser_enabled, CTLFLAG_RW,
@@ -86,9 +84,11 @@
* once the SUSER_ALLOWJAIL flag has gone away.
*/
error = prison_priv_check(cred, priv);
+#ifdef NOTYET
KASSERT(!jailed(cred) || error == ((flags & SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) ? 0 :
EPERM), ("priv_check_cred: prison_priv_check %d but flags %s",
error, flags & SUSER_ALLOWJAIL ? "allowjail" : "!allowjail"));
+#endif
if (error)
return (error);
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@
*
* Superuser policy grants privilege based on the effective (or in
* certain edge cases, real) uid being 0. We allow the policy to be
- * globally disabled, although this is currently of limited uility.
+ * globally disabled, although this is currently of limited utility.
*/
if (suser_enabled) {
if (flags & SUSER_RUID) {
@@ -134,8 +134,8 @@
/*
* Historical suser() wrapper functions, which now simply request PRIV_ROOT.
- * These will be removed in the near future, and exist solely because the
- * list of global privileges is not yet complete.
+ * These will be removed in the near future, and exist solely because
+ * the kernel and modules are not yet fully adapted to the new model.
*/
int
suser_cred(struct ucred *cred, int flags)
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