PERFORCE change 84124 for review
Robert Watson
rwatson at FreeBSD.org
Thu Sep 22 11:47:11 GMT 2005
http://perforce.freebsd.org/chv.cgi?CH=84124
Change 84124 by rwatson at rwatson_peppercorn on 2005/09/22 11:46:40
Break kern_acl.c contents out into two parts:
- kern_acl.c: ACL functions that are common across all ACL types.
- subr_acl_posix1e.c: ACL functions that are specific to POSIX.1e
ACLs.
Affected files ...
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/acl_nfsv4/src/sys/kern/kern_acl.c#2 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/acl_nfsv4/src/sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c#2 edit
Differences ...
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/acl_nfsv4/src/sys/kern/kern_acl.c#2 (text+ko) ====
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*-
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Robert N. M. Watson
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2003, 2005 Robert N. M. Watson
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
*/
/*
* Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
- * Support for POSIX.1e access control lists.
+ *
+ * System calls and functions common across all ACL types.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
@@ -65,586 +66,6 @@
acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
/*
- * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics.
- * Return 0 on success, else an errno value. Should be merged into
- * vaccess() eventually.
- */
-int
-vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid,
- struct acl *acl, mode_t acc_mode, struct ucred *cred, int *privused)
-{
- struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask;
- mode_t dac_granted;
- mode_t cap_granted;
- mode_t acl_mask_granted;
- int group_matched, i;
-
- /*
- * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory
- * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt
- * to use privileges granted via cap_granted. In some cases,
- * which privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match",
- * in which case fall back on first match for the time being.
- */
- if (privused != NULL)
- *privused = 0;
-
- /*
- * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found
- * a DAC entry that matches but has failed to allow access.
- */
-#ifndef CAPABILITIES
- if (suser_cred(cred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) == 0)
- cap_granted = VALLPERM;
- else
- cap_granted = 0;
-#else
- cap_granted = 0;
-
- if (type == VDIR) {
- if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !cap_check(cred, NULL,
- CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
- cap_granted |= VEXEC;
- } else {
- if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !cap_check(cred, NULL,
- CAP_DAC_EXECUTE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
- cap_granted |= VEXEC;
- }
-
- if ((acc_mode & VREAD) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
- SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
- cap_granted |= VREAD;
-
- if (((acc_mode & VWRITE) || (acc_mode & VAPPEND)) &&
- !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_DAC_WRITE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
- cap_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
-
- if ((acc_mode & VADMIN) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_FOWNER,
- SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
- cap_granted |= VADMIN;
-#endif /* CAPABILITIES */
-
- /*
- * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the
- * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're
- * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK
- * and ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations.
- */
- acl_mask = acl_other = NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
- switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
- case ACL_USER_OBJ:
- if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid)
- break;
- dac_granted = 0;
- dac_granted |= VADMIN;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
- dac_granted |= VEXEC;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
- dac_granted |= VREAD;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
- dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
- if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
- return (0);
- if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) ==
- acc_mode) {
- if (privused != NULL)
- *privused = 1;
- return (0);
- }
- goto error;
-
- case ACL_MASK:
- acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
- break;
-
- case ACL_OTHER:
- acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access
- * ACL. If it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now,
- * this means a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future
- * should probably be a panic.
- */
- if (acl_other == NULL) {
- /*
- * XXX This should never happen
- */
- printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n");
- return (EPERM);
- }
-
- /*
- * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields
- * are masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify
- * the ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential
- * user matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK,
- * assume that the mask allows all requests to succeed.
- */
- if (acl_mask != NULL) {
- acl_mask_granted = 0;
- if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
- acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC;
- if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
- acl_mask_granted |= VREAD;
- if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
- acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
- } else
- acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND;
-
- /*
- * Iterate through user ACL entries. Do checks twice, first
- * without privilege, and then if a match is found but failed,
- * a second time with privilege.
- */
-
- /*
- * Check ACL_USER ACL entries.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
- switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
- case ACL_USER:
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid)
- break;
- dac_granted = 0;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
- dac_granted |= VEXEC;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
- dac_granted |= VREAD;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
- dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
- dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
- if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
- return (0);
- if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
- acc_mode)
- goto error;
-
- if (privused != NULL)
- *privused = 1;
- return (0);
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a
- * "best" match. Iterate across, testing each potential group
- * match. Make sure we keep track of whether we found a match
- * or not, so that we know if we should try again with any
- * available privilege, or if we should move on to ACL_OTHER.
- */
- group_matched = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
- switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
- case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
- if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
- break;
- dac_granted = 0;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
- dac_granted |= VEXEC;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
- dac_granted |= VREAD;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
- dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
- dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
-
- if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
- return (0);
-
- group_matched = 1;
- break;
-
- case ACL_GROUP:
- if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred))
- break;
- dac_granted = 0;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
- dac_granted |= VEXEC;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
- dac_granted |= VREAD;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
- dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
- dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
-
- if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
- return (0);
-
- group_matched = 1;
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (group_matched == 1) {
- /*
- * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via
- * pure DAC. Try again, this time with privilege.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
- switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
- case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
- if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
- break;
- dac_granted = 0;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
- dac_granted |= VEXEC;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
- dac_granted |= VREAD;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
- dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
- dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
-
- if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
- acc_mode)
- break;
-
- if (privused != NULL)
- *privused = 1;
- return (0);
-
- case ACL_GROUP:
- if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id,
- cred))
- break;
- dac_granted = 0;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
- dac_granted |= VEXEC;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
- dac_granted |= VREAD;
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
- dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
- dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
-
- if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
- acc_mode)
- break;
-
- if (privused != NULL)
- *privused = 1;
- return (0);
-
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient.
- * Return failure.
- */
- goto error;
- }
-
- /*
- * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER.
- */
- dac_granted = 0;
- if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
- dac_granted |= VEXEC;
- if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
- dac_granted |= VREAD;
- if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
- dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
-
- if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
- return (0);
- if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) == acc_mode) {
- if (privused != NULL)
- *privused = 1;
- return (0);
- }
-
-error:
- return ((acc_mode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES);
-}
-
-/*
- * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an
- * inode with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry
- * to an acl_perm_t.
- */
-acl_perm_t
-acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode)
-{
- acl_perm_t perm = 0;
-
- switch(tag) {
- case ACL_USER_OBJ:
- if (mode & S_IXUSR)
- perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
- if (mode & S_IRUSR)
- perm |= ACL_READ;
- if (mode & S_IWUSR)
- perm |= ACL_WRITE;
- return (perm);
-
- case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
- if (mode & S_IXGRP)
- perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
- if (mode & S_IRGRP)
- perm |= ACL_READ;
- if (mode & S_IWGRP)
- perm |= ACL_WRITE;
- return (perm);
-
- case ACL_OTHER:
- if (mode & S_IXOTH)
- perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
- if (mode & S_IROTH)
- perm |= ACL_READ;
- if (mode & S_IWOTH)
- perm |= ACL_WRITE;
- return (perm);
-
- default:
- printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
- return (0);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the
- * appropriate type.
- */
-struct acl_entry
-acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
-{
- struct acl_entry acl_entry;
-
- acl_entry.ae_tag = tag;
- acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode);
- switch(tag) {
- case ACL_USER_OBJ:
- acl_entry.ae_id = uid;
- break;
-
- case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
- acl_entry.ae_id = gid;
- break;
-
- case ACL_OTHER:
- acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
- break;
-
- default:
- acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
- printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
- }
-
- return (acl_entry);
-}
-
-/*
- * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries.
- */
-mode_t
-acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry,
- struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry)
-{
- mode_t mode;
-
- mode = 0;
- if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
- mode |= S_IXUSR;
- if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
- mode |= S_IRUSR;
- if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
- mode |= S_IWUSR;
- if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
- mode |= S_IXGRP;
- if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
- mode |= S_IRGRP;
- if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
- mode |= S_IWGRP;
- if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
- mode |= S_IXOTH;
- if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
- mode |= S_IROTH;
- if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
- mode |= S_IWOTH;
-
- return (mode);
-}
-
-/*
- * Utility function to generate a file mode given a complete POSIX.1e
- * access ACL. Note that if the ACL is improperly formed, this may
- * result in a panic.
- */
-mode_t
-acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl *acl)
-{
- struct acl_entry *acl_mask, *acl_user_obj, *acl_group_obj, *acl_other;
- int i;
-
- /*
- * Find the ACL entries relevant to a POSIX permission mode.
- */
- acl_user_obj = acl_group_obj = acl_other = acl_mask = NULL;
- for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
- switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
- case ACL_USER_OBJ:
- acl_user_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
- break;
-
- case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
- acl_group_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
- break;
-
- case ACL_OTHER:
- acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
- break;
-
- case ACL_MASK:
- acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
- break;
-
- case ACL_USER:
- case ACL_GROUP:
- break;
-
- default:
- panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: bad ae_tag");
- }
- }
-
- if (acl_user_obj == NULL || acl_group_obj == NULL || acl_other == NULL)
- panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: missing base ae_tags");
-
- /*
- * POSIX.1e specifies that if there is an ACL_MASK entry, we replace
- * the mode "group" bits with its permissions. If there isn't, we
- * use the ACL_GROUP_OBJ permissions.
- */
- if (acl_mask != NULL)
- return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_mask,
- acl_other));
- else
- return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_group_obj,
- acl_other));
-}
-
-/*
- * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an
- * implementing filesystem to determine if it should accept this and
- * rely on the POSIX.1e ACL properties.
- */
-int
-acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl)
-{
- int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group;
- int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i;
-
- /*
- * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum
- * defined for acl_t.
- * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are
- * present:
- * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ
- * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ
- * Exactly one ACL_OTHER
- * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one
- * ACL_MASK entry must also appear.
- * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS.
- * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation.
- * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field.
- */
- num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group =
- num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0;
- if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES || acl->acl_cnt < 0)
- return (EINVAL);
- for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
- /*
- * Check for a valid tag.
- */
- switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
- case ACL_USER_OBJ:
- acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
- return (EINVAL);
- num_acl_user_obj++;
- break;
- case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
- acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
- return (EINVAL);
- num_acl_group_obj++;
- break;
- case ACL_USER:
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
- return (EINVAL);
- num_acl_user++;
- break;
- case ACL_GROUP:
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
- return (EINVAL);
- num_acl_group++;
- break;
- case ACL_OTHER:
- acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
- return (EINVAL);
- num_acl_other++;
- break;
- case ACL_MASK:
- acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
- if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
- return (EINVAL);
- num_acl_mask++;
- break;
- default:
- return (EINVAL);
- }
- /*
- * Check for valid perm entries.
- */
- if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) !=
- ACL_PERM_BITS)
- return (EINVAL);
- }
- if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) ||
- (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1))
- return (EINVAL);
- if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) &&
- (num_acl_mask != 1))
- return (EINVAL);
- return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a requested mode for a new object, and a default ACL, combine
- * the two to produce a new mode. Be careful not to clear any bits that
- * aren't intended to be affected by the POSIX.1e ACL. Eventually,
- * this might also take the cmask as an argument, if we push that down
- * into per-filesystem-code.
- */
-mode_t
-acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode, struct acl *dacl)
-{
- mode_t mode;
-
- mode = cmode;
- /*
- * The current composition policy is that a permission bit must
- * be set in *both* the ACL and the requested creation mode for
- * it to appear in the resulting mode/ACL. First clear any
- * possibly effected bits, then reconstruct.
- */
- mode &= ACL_PRESERVE_MASK;
- mode |= (ACL_OVERRIDE_MASK & cmode & acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(dacl));
-
- return (mode);
-}
-
-/*
* These calls wrap the real vnode operations, and are called by the
* syscall code once the syscall has converted the path or file
* descriptor to a vnode (unlocked). The aclp pointer is assumed
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/acl_nfsv4/src/sys/kern/subr_acl_posix1e.c#2 (text+ko) ====
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*-
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Robert N. M. Watson
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2003, 2005 Robert N. M. Watson
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
@@ -56,14 +56,6 @@
#include <vm/uma.h>
-uma_zone_t acl_zone;
-static int vacl_set_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
- acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
-static int vacl_get_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
- acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
-static int vacl_aclcheck(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
- acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
-
/*
* Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics.
* Return 0 on success, else an errno value. Should be merged into
@@ -643,394 +635,3 @@
return (mode);
}
-
-/*
- * These calls wrap the real vnode operations, and are called by the
- * syscall code once the syscall has converted the path or file
- * descriptor to a vnode (unlocked). The aclp pointer is assumed
- * still to point to userland, so this should not be consumed within
- * the kernel except by syscall code. Other code should directly
- * invoke VOP_{SET,GET}ACL.
- */
-
-/*
- * Given a vnode, set its ACL.
- */
-static int
-vacl_set_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
- struct acl *aclp)
-{
- struct acl inkernacl;
- struct mount *mp;
- int error;
-
- error = copyin(aclp, &inkernacl, sizeof(struct acl));
- if (error)
- return(error);
- error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
- if (error != 0)
- return (error);
- VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
- vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
-#ifdef MAC
- error = mac_check_vnode_setacl(td->td_ucred, vp, type, &inkernacl);
- if (error != 0)
- goto out;
-#endif
- error = VOP_SETACL(vp, type, &inkernacl, td->td_ucred, td);
-#ifdef MAC
-out:
-#endif
- VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
- vn_finished_write(mp);
- return(error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a vnode, get its ACL.
- */
-static int
-vacl_get_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
- struct acl *aclp)
-{
- struct acl inkernelacl;
- int error;
-
- VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
- vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
-#ifdef MAC
- error = mac_check_vnode_getacl(td->td_ucred, vp, type);
- if (error != 0)
- goto out;
-#endif
- error = VOP_GETACL(vp, type, &inkernelacl, td->td_ucred, td);
-#ifdef MAC
-out:
-#endif
- VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
- if (error == 0)
- error = copyout(&inkernelacl, aclp, sizeof(struct acl));
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a vnode, delete its ACL.
- */
-static int
-vacl_delete(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type)
-{
- struct mount *mp;
- int error;
-
- error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
- if (error)
- return (error);
- VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
- vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
-#ifdef MAC
- error = mac_check_vnode_deleteacl(td->td_ucred, vp, type);
- if (error)
- goto out;
-#endif
- error = VOP_SETACL(vp, type, 0, td->td_ucred, td);
-#ifdef MAC
-out:
-#endif
- VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
- vn_finished_write(mp);
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a vnode, check whether an ACL is appropriate for it
- */
-static int
-vacl_aclcheck(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
- struct acl *aclp)
-{
- struct acl inkernelacl;
- int error;
-
- error = copyin(aclp, &inkernelacl, sizeof(struct acl));
- if (error)
- return(error);
- error = VOP_ACLCHECK(vp, type, &inkernelacl, td->td_ucred, td);
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * syscalls -- convert the path/fd to a vnode, and call vacl_whatever.
- * Don't need to lock, as the vacl_ code will get/release any locks
- * required.
- */
-
-/*
- * Given a file path, get an ACL for it
- *
- * MPSAFE
- */
-int
-__acl_get_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_get_file_args *uap)
-{
- struct nameidata nd;
- int vfslocked, error;
-
- NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, MPSAFE|FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
- error = namei(&nd);
- vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd);
- if (error == 0) {
- error = vacl_get_acl(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type, uap->aclp);
- NDFREE(&nd, 0);
- }
- VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a file path, get an ACL for it; don't follow links.
- *
- * MPSAFE
- */
-int
-__acl_get_link(struct thread *td, struct __acl_get_link_args *uap)
-{
- struct nameidata nd;
- int vfslocked, error;
-
- NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, MPSAFE|NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
- error = namei(&nd);
- vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd);
- if (error == 0) {
- error = vacl_get_acl(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type, uap->aclp);
- NDFREE(&nd, 0);
- }
- VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a file path, set an ACL for it
- *
- * MPSAFE
- */
-int
-__acl_set_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_set_file_args *uap)
-{
- struct nameidata nd;
- int vfslocked, error;
-
- NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, MPSAFE|FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
- error = namei(&nd);
- vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd);
- if (error == 0) {
- error = vacl_set_acl(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type, uap->aclp);
- NDFREE(&nd, 0);
- }
- VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a file path, set an ACL for it; don't follow links.
- *
- * MPSAFE
- */
-int
-__acl_set_link(struct thread *td, struct __acl_set_link_args *uap)
-{
- struct nameidata nd;
- int vfslocked, error;
-
- NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, MPSAFE|NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
- error = namei(&nd);
- vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd);
- if (error == 0) {
- error = vacl_set_acl(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type, uap->aclp);
- NDFREE(&nd, 0);
- }
- VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a file descriptor, get an ACL for it
- *
- * MPSAFE
- */
-int
-__acl_get_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_get_fd_args *uap)
-{
- struct file *fp;
- int vfslocked, error;
-
- error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->filedes, &fp);
- if (error == 0) {
- vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(fp->f_vnode->v_mount);
- error = vacl_get_acl(td, fp->f_vnode, uap->type, uap->aclp);
- fdrop(fp, td);
- VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
- }
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a file descriptor, set an ACL for it
- *
- * MPSAFE
- */
-int
-__acl_set_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_set_fd_args *uap)
-{
- struct file *fp;
- int vfslocked, error;
-
- error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->filedes, &fp);
- if (error == 0) {
- vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(fp->f_vnode->v_mount);
- error = vacl_set_acl(td, fp->f_vnode, uap->type, uap->aclp);
- fdrop(fp, td);
- VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
- }
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a file path, delete an ACL from it.
- *
- * MPSAFE
- */
-int
-__acl_delete_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_delete_file_args *uap)
-{
- struct nameidata nd;
- int vfslocked, error;
-
- NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, MPSAFE|FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
- error = namei(&nd);
- vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd);
- if (error == 0) {
- error = vacl_delete(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type);
- NDFREE(&nd, 0);
- }
- VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a file path, delete an ACL from it; don't follow links.
- *
- * MPSAFE
- */
-int
-__acl_delete_link(struct thread *td, struct __acl_delete_link_args *uap)
-{
- struct nameidata nd;
- int vfslocked, error;
-
- NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, MPSAFE|NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
- error = namei(&nd);
- vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd);
- if (error == 0) {
- error = vacl_delete(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type);
- NDFREE(&nd, 0);
- }
- VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a file path, delete an ACL from it.
- *
- * MPSAFE
- */
-int
-__acl_delete_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_delete_fd_args *uap)
-{
- struct file *fp;
- int vfslocked, error;
-
- error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->filedes, &fp);
- if (error == 0) {
- vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(fp->f_vnode->v_mount);
- error = vacl_delete(td, fp->f_vnode, uap->type);
- fdrop(fp, td);
- VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
- }
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a file path, check an ACL for it
- *
- * MPSAFE
- */
-int
-__acl_aclcheck_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_aclcheck_file_args *uap)
-{
- struct nameidata nd;
- int vfslocked, error;
-
- NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, MPSAFE|FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
- error = namei(&nd);
- vfslocked = NDHASGIANT(&nd);
- if (error == 0) {
- error = vacl_aclcheck(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type, uap->aclp);
- NDFREE(&nd, 0);
- }
- VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
- return (error);
-}
-
-/*
- * Given a file path, check an ACL for it; don't follow links.
- *
- * MPSAFE
- */
-int
-__acl_aclcheck_link(struct thread *td, struct __acl_aclcheck_link_args *uap)
-{
- struct nameidata nd;
- int vfslocked, error;
-
- NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, MPSAFE|NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
>>> TRUNCATED FOR MAIL (1000 lines) <<<
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