PERFORCE change 69924 for review
Robert Watson
rwatson at FreeBSD.org
Sat Jan 29 17:24:23 GMT 2005
http://perforce.freebsd.org/chv.cgi?CH=69924
Change 69924 by rwatson at rwatson_paprika on 2005/01/29 17:23:27
MAC Framework entry points and stub policy implementations to
allow MAC policies to instrument the various set*id() system calls.
Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra
Affected files ...
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/kern_prot.c#44 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c#14 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac_stub/mac_stub.c#24 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c#139 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac.h#264 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac_policy.h#221 edit
Differences ...
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/kern_prot.c#44 (text+ko) ====
@@ -500,6 +500,12 @@
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_proc_setuid(p, oldcred, uid);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+#endif
+
/*
* See if we have "permission" by POSIX 1003.1 rules.
*
@@ -524,12 +530,8 @@
#ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */
uid != oldcred->cr_uid && /* allow setuid(geteuid()) */
#endif
- (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0) {
- PROC_UNLOCK(p);
- uifree(uip);
- crfree(newcred);
- return (error);
- }
+ (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
/*
* Copy credentials so other references do not see our changes.
@@ -579,6 +581,12 @@
uifree(uip);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
+
+fail:
+ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+ uifree(uip);
+ crfree(newcred);
+ return (error);
}
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
@@ -604,14 +612,18 @@
euip = uifind(euid);
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
+
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_proc_seteuid(p, oldcred, euid;
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+#endif
+
if (euid != oldcred->cr_ruid && /* allow seteuid(getuid()) */
euid != oldcred->cr_svuid && /* allow seteuid(saved uid) */
- (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0) {
- PROC_UNLOCK(p);
- uifree(euip);
- crfree(newcred);
- return (error);
- }
+ (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+
/*
* Everything's okay, do it. Copy credentials so other references do
* not see our changes.
@@ -626,6 +638,12 @@
uifree(euip);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
+
+fail:
+ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+ uifree(euip);
+ crfree(newcred);
+ return (error);
}
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
@@ -650,6 +668,12 @@
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_proc_setgid(p, oldcred, gid);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+#endif
+
/*
* See if we have "permission" by POSIX 1003.1 rules.
*
@@ -668,11 +692,8 @@
#ifdef POSIX_APPENDIX_B_4_2_2 /* Use BSD-compat clause from B.4.2.2 */
gid != oldcred->cr_groups[0] && /* allow setgid(getegid()) */
#endif
- (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0) {
- PROC_UNLOCK(p);
- crfree(newcred);
- return (error);
- }
+ (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
#ifdef _POSIX_SAVED_IDS
@@ -718,6 +739,11 @@
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
+
+fail:
+ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+ crfree(newcred);
+ return (error);
}
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
@@ -741,13 +767,18 @@
newcred = crget();
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
+
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_proc_setegid(p, oldcred, egid);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+#endif
+
if (egid != oldcred->cr_rgid && /* allow setegid(getgid()) */
egid != oldcred->cr_svgid && /* allow setegid(saved gid) */
- (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0) {
- PROC_UNLOCK(p);
- crfree(newcred);
- return (error);
- }
+ (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
if (oldcred->cr_groups[0] != egid) {
change_egid(newcred, egid);
@@ -757,6 +788,11 @@
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
+
+fail:
+ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+ crfree(newcred);
+ return (error);
}
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
@@ -789,14 +825,18 @@
newcred = crget();
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
+
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_proc_setgroups(p, oldcred, ngrp,
+ tempcred->cr_groups);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+#endif
+
error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL);
- if (error) {
- PROC_UNLOCK(p);
- crfree(newcred);
- crfree(tempcred);
- return (error);
- }
-
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+
/*
* XXX A little bit lazy here. We could test if anything has
* changed before crcopy() and setting P_SUGID.
@@ -821,6 +861,12 @@
crfree(tempcred);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
+
+fail:
+ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+ crfree(newcred);
+ crfree(tempcred);
+ return (error);
}
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
@@ -849,17 +895,20 @@
ruip = uifind(ruid);
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
+
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_proc_setreuid(p, oldcred, ruid, euid);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+#endif
+
if (((ruid != (uid_t)-1 && ruid != oldcred->cr_ruid &&
ruid != oldcred->cr_svuid) ||
(euid != (uid_t)-1 && euid != oldcred->cr_uid &&
euid != oldcred->cr_ruid && euid != oldcred->cr_svuid)) &&
- (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0) {
- PROC_UNLOCK(p);
- uifree(ruip);
- uifree(euip);
- crfree(newcred);
- return (error);
- }
+ (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
if (euid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_uid != euid) {
change_euid(newcred, euip);
@@ -880,6 +929,13 @@
uifree(euip);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
+
+fail:
+ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+ uifree(ruip);
+ uifree(euip);
+ crfree(newcred);
+ return (error);
}
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
@@ -905,15 +961,19 @@
newcred = crget();
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
+
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_proc_setregid(p, oldcred, rgid, egid);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+#endif
+
if (((rgid != (gid_t)-1 && rgid != oldcred->cr_rgid &&
rgid != oldcred->cr_svgid) ||
(egid != (gid_t)-1 && egid != oldcred->cr_groups[0] &&
egid != oldcred->cr_rgid && egid != oldcred->cr_svgid)) &&
- (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0) {
- PROC_UNLOCK(p);
- crfree(newcred);
- return (error);
- }
+ (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
if (egid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_groups[0] != egid) {
@@ -933,6 +993,11 @@
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
+
+fail:
+ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+ crfree(newcred);
+ return (error);
}
/*
@@ -968,6 +1033,13 @@
ruip = uifind(ruid);
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
+
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_proc_setresuid(p, oldcred, ruid, euid, suid);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+#endif
+
if (((ruid != (uid_t)-1 && ruid != oldcred->cr_ruid &&
ruid != oldcred->cr_svuid &&
ruid != oldcred->cr_uid) ||
@@ -977,13 +1049,8 @@
(suid != (uid_t)-1 && suid != oldcred->cr_ruid &&
suid != oldcred->cr_svuid &&
suid != oldcred->cr_uid)) &&
- (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0) {
- PROC_UNLOCK(p);
- uifree(ruip);
- uifree(euip);
- crfree(newcred);
- return (error);
- }
+ (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
if (euid != (uid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_uid != euid) {
@@ -1004,6 +1071,14 @@
uifree(euip);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
+
+fail:
+ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+ uifree(ruip);
+ uifree(euip);
+ crfree(newcred);
+ return (error);
+
}
/*
@@ -1036,6 +1111,13 @@
newcred = crget();
PROC_LOCK(p);
oldcred = p->p_ucred;
+
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_proc_setresgid(p, oldcred, rgid, egid, sgid);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+#endif
+
if (((rgid != (gid_t)-1 && rgid != oldcred->cr_rgid &&
rgid != oldcred->cr_svgid &&
rgid != oldcred->cr_groups[0]) ||
@@ -1045,11 +1127,8 @@
(sgid != (gid_t)-1 && sgid != oldcred->cr_rgid &&
sgid != oldcred->cr_svgid &&
sgid != oldcred->cr_groups[0])) &&
- (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0) {
- PROC_UNLOCK(p);
- crfree(newcred);
- return (error);
- }
+ (error = suser_cred(oldcred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
crcopy(newcred, oldcred);
if (egid != (gid_t)-1 && oldcred->cr_groups[0] != egid) {
@@ -1068,6 +1147,11 @@
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
crfree(oldcred);
return (0);
+
+fail:
+ PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+ crfree(newcred);
+ return (error);
}
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c#14 (text+ko) ====
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
* Copyright (c) 1999-2002 Robert N. M. Watson
* Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Samy Al Bahra
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
@@ -85,6 +86,11 @@
&mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files via "
"copy-on-write semantics, or by removing all write access");
+static int mac_enforce_suid = 1;
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_suid, CTLFLAW_RW,
+ &mac_enforce_suid, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on suid/sgid operations");
+TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_suid", &mac_enforce_suid);
+
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
static unsigned int nmaccreds, nmacprocs;
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, creds, CTLFLAG_RD,
@@ -515,6 +521,137 @@
}
int
+mac_check_proc_setuid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, uid_t uid)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_suid)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_proc_setuid, cred, uid);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_proc_seteuid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, uid_t euid)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_suid)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_proc_seteuid, cred, euid);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_proc_setgid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_suid)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_proc_setgid, cred, gid);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_proc_setegid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, gid_t egid)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_suid)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_proc_setegid, cred, egid);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_proc_setgroups(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred,
+ int ngroups, gid_t *gidset)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_suid)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_proc_setgroups, cred, ngroups, gidset);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_proc_setreuid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid,
+ uid_t euid)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_suid)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_proc_setreuid, cred, ruid, euid);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_proc_setregid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid,
+ gid_t egid)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_suid)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_proc_setregid, cred, rgid, egid);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_proc_setresuid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid,
+ uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_suid)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_proc_setresuid, cred, ruid, euid, suid);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_proc_setresgid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid,
+ gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_suid)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_proc_setresgid, cred, rgid, egid, sgid);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
mac_check_proc_wait(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc)
{
int error;
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac_stub/mac_stub.c#24 (text+ko) ====
@@ -924,6 +924,72 @@
}
static int
+stub_check_proc_setuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t uid)
+{
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+stub_check_proc_seteuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t euid)
+{
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+stub_check_proc_setgid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid)
+{
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+stub_check_proc_setegid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t egid)
+{
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+stub_check_proc_setgroups(struct ucred *cred, int ngroups,
+ gid_t *gidset)
+{
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+stub_check_proc_setreuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
+{
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+stub_check_proc_setregid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
+{
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+stub_check_proc_setresuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, uid_t euid,
+ uid_t suid)
+{
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+stub_check_proc_setresgid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, gid_t egid,
+ gid_t sgid)
+{
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
stub_check_socket_bind(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
struct label *socketlabel, struct sockaddr *sockaddr)
{
@@ -1442,6 +1508,15 @@
.mpo_check_posix_sem_wait = stub_check_posix_sem_wait,
.mpo_check_proc_debug = stub_check_proc_debug,
.mpo_check_proc_sched = stub_check_proc_sched,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setuid = stub_check_proc_setuid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_seteuid = stub_check_proc_seteuid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setgid = stub_check_proc_setgid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setegid = stub_check_proc_setegid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setgroups = stub_check_proc_setgroups,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setreuid = stub_check_proc_setreuid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setregid = stub_check_proc_setregid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setresuid = stub_check_proc_setresuid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setresgid = stub_check_proc_setresgid,
.mpo_check_proc_signal = stub_check_proc_signal,
.mpo_check_proc_wait = stub_check_proc_wait,
.mpo_check_socket_bind = stub_check_socket_bind,
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac_test/mac_test.c#139 (text+ko) ====
@@ -1796,6 +1796,90 @@
}
static int
+mac_test_check_proc_setuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t uid)
+{
+
+ ASSERT_CRED_LABEL(cred->cr_label);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+mac_test_check_proc_seteuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t euid)
+{
+
+ ASSERT_CRED_LABEL(cred->cr_label);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+mac_test_check_proc_setgid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid)
+{
+
+ ASSERT_CRED_LABEL(cred->cr_label);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+mac_test_check_proc_setegid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t egid)
+{
+
+ ASSERT_CRED_LABEL(cred->cr_label);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+mac_test_check_proc_setgroups(struct ucred *cred, int ngroups,
+ gid_t *gidset)
+{
+
+ ASSERT_CRED_LABEL(cred->cr_label);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+mac_test_check_proc_setreuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
+{
+
+ ASSERT_CRED_LABEL(cred->cr_label);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+mac_test_check_proc_setregid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
+{
+
+ ASSERT_CRED_LABEL(cred->cr_label);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+mac_test_check_proc_setresuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, uid_t euid,
+ uid_t suid)
+{
+
+ ASSERT_CRED_LABEL(cred->cr_label);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+mac_test_check_proc_setresgid(struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, gid_t egid,
+ gid_t sgid)
+{
+
+ ASSERT_CRED_LABEL(cred->cr_label);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
mac_test_check_socket_bind(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
struct label *socketlabel, struct sockaddr *sockaddr)
{
@@ -2468,6 +2552,15 @@
.mpo_check_posix_sem_wait = mac_test_check_posix_ksem,
.mpo_check_proc_debug = mac_test_check_proc_debug,
.mpo_check_proc_sched = mac_test_check_proc_sched,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setuid = mac_test_check_proc_setuid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_seteuid = mac_test_check_proc_seteuid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setgid = mac_test_check_proc_setgid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setegid = mac_test_check_proc_setegid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setgroups = mac_test_check_proc_setgroups,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setreuid = mac_test_check_proc_setreuid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setregid = mac_test_check_proc_setregid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setresuid = mac_test_check_proc_setresuid,
+ .mpo_check_proc_setresgid = mac_test_check_proc_setresgid,
.mpo_check_proc_signal = mac_test_check_proc_signal,
.mpo_check_proc_wait = mac_test_check_proc_wait,
.mpo_check_socket_bind = mac_test_check_socket_bind,
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac.h#264 (text+ko) ====
@@ -350,6 +350,24 @@
int mac_check_posix_sem_wait(struct ucred *cred, struct ksem *ksemptr);
int mac_check_proc_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc);
int mac_check_proc_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc);
+int mac_check_proc_setuid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred,
+ uid_t uid);
+int mac_check_proc_seteuid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred,
+ uid_t euid);
+int mac_check_proc_setgid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred,
+ gid_t gid);
+int mac_check_proc_setegid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred,
+ gid_t egid);
+int mac_check_proc_setgroups(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred,
+ int ngroups, gid_t *gidset);
+int mac_check_proc_setreuid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred,
+ uid_t ruid, uid_t euid);
+int mac_check_proc_setregid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred,
+ gid_t rgid, gid_t egid);
+int mac_check_proc_setresuid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred,
+ uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid);
+int mac_check_proc_setresgid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred,
+ gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid);
int mac_check_proc_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc,
int signum);
int mac_check_proc_wait(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc);
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac_policy.h#221 (text+ko) ====
@@ -435,6 +435,20 @@
struct proc *proc);
int (*mpo_check_proc_sched)(struct ucred *cred,
struct proc *proc);
+ int (*mpo_check_proc_setuid)(struct ucred *cred, uid_t uid);
+ int (*mpo_check_proc_seteuid)(struct ucred *cred, uid_t euid);
+ int (*mpo_check_proc_setgid)(struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid);
+ int (*mpo_check_proc_setegid)(struct ucred *cred, gid_t egid);
+ int (*mpo_check_proc_setgroups)(struct ucred *cred, int ngroups,
+ gid_t *gidset);
+ int (*mpo_check_proc_setreuid)(struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid,
+ uid_t euid);
+ int (*mpo_check_proc_setregid)(struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid,
+ gid_t egid);
+ int (*mpo_check_proc_setresuid)(struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid,
+ uid_t euid, uid_t suid);
+ int (*mpo_check_proc_setresgid)(struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid,
+ gid_t egid, gid_t sgid);
int (*mpo_check_proc_signal)(struct ucred *cred,
struct proc *proc, int signum);
int (*mpo_check_proc_wait)(struct ucred *cred,
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