PERFORCE change 40049 for review
Robert Watson
rwatson at FreeBSD.org
Tue Oct 21 00:43:50 GMT 2003
http://perforce.freebsd.org/chv.cgi?CH=40049
Change 40049 by rwatson at rwatson_tislabs on 2003/10/20 17:43:36
Break System V IPC primitive MAC Framework pieces into their
own files. mac_sysvipc_enforce is visible outside of the
files because it is shared between them. Might want to make
each type have its own local enforcement variable.
Affected files ...
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/conf/files#88 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/kern_mac.c#415 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h#4 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac/mac_sysv_msg.c#2 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac/mac_sysv_sem.c#2 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac/mac_sysv_shm.c#2 edit
Differences ...
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/conf/files#88 (text+ko) ====
@@ -1591,6 +1591,9 @@
security/mac/mac_pipe.c optional mac
security/mac/mac_posix_sem.c optional mac
security/mac/mac_system.c optional mac
+security/mac/mac_sysv_msg.c optional mac
+security/mac/mac_sysv_sem.c optional mac
+security/mac/mac_sysv_shm.c optional mac
security/mac_biba/mac_biba.c optional mac_biba
security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c optional mac_bsdextended
security/mac_ifoff/mac_ifoff.c optional mac_ifoff
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/kern_mac.c#415 (text+ko) ====
@@ -68,10 +68,6 @@
#include <sys/pipe.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
-#include <sys/msg.h>
-#include <sys/msg_msg.h>
-#include <sys/sem.h>
-#include <sys/shm.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <vm/pmap.h>
@@ -160,11 +156,6 @@
&mac_enforce_socket, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on socket operations");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_socket", &mac_enforce_socket);
-static int mac_enforce_sysv = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_sysv, CTLFLAG_RW,
- &mac_enforce_sysv, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on System V IPC objects");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_sysv", &mac_enforce_sysv);
-
static int mac_enforce_vm = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_vm, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_enforce_vm, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on vm operations");
@@ -196,8 +187,7 @@
static unsigned int nmacmbufs, nmaccreds, nmacifnets, nmacbpfdescs,
nmacsockets, nmacmounts, nmactemp, nmacvnodes, nmacdevfsdirents,
- nmacipqs, nmacprocs, nmacipcmsgs, nmacipcmsqs,
- nmacipcsemas, nmacipcshms;
+ nmacipqs, nmacprocs;
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, mbufs, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacmbufs, 0, "number of mbufs in use");
@@ -221,14 +211,6 @@
&nmacvnodes, 0, "number of vnodes in use");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, devfsdirents, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacdevfsdirents, 0, "number of devfs dirents inuse");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipc_msgs, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacipcmsgs, 0, "number of sysv ipc messages inuse");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipc_msqs, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacipcmsqs, 0, "number of sysv ipc message queue identifiers inuse");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipc_semas, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacipcsemas, 0, "number of sysv ipc semaphore identifiers inuse");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipc_shms, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacipcshms, 0, "number of sysv ipc shm identifiers inuse");
#endif
static int mac_policy_register(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc);
@@ -701,42 +683,6 @@
mac_init_ifnet_label(&ifp->if_label);
}
-void
-mac_init_ipc_msgmsg(struct msg *msgptr)
-{
-
- mac_init_label(&msgptr->label);
- MAC_PERFORM(init_ipc_msgmsg_label, &msgptr->label);
- MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacipcmsgs);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_ipc_msgqueue(struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr)
-{
-
- mac_init_label(&msqkptr->label);
- MAC_PERFORM(init_ipc_msgqueue_label, &msqkptr->label);
- MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacipcmsqs);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_ipc_sema(struct semid_kernel *semakptr)
-{
-
- mac_init_label(&semakptr->label);
- MAC_PERFORM(init_ipc_sema_label, &semakptr->label);
- MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacipcsemas);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_ipc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr)
-{
-
- mac_init_label(&shmsegptr->label);
- MAC_PERFORM(init_ipc_shm_label, &shmsegptr->label);
- MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacipcshms);
-}
-
int
mac_init_ipq(struct ipq *ipq, int flag)
{
@@ -939,42 +885,6 @@
}
void
-mac_destroy_ipc_msgmsg(struct msg *msgptr)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ipc_msgmsg_label, &msgptr->label);
- mac_destroy_label(&msgptr->label);
- MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmacipcmsgs);
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_ipc_msgqueue(struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ipc_msgqueue_label, &msqkptr->label);
- mac_destroy_label(&msqkptr->label);
- MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmacipcmsqs);
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_ipc_sema(struct semid_kernel *semakptr)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ipc_sema_label, &semakptr->label);
- mac_destroy_label(&semakptr->label);
- MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmacipcsemas);
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_ipc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ipc_shm_label, &shmsegptr->label);
- mac_destroy_label(&shmsegptr->label);
- MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmacipcshms);
-}
-
-void
mac_destroy_ipq(struct ipq *ipq)
{
@@ -2108,36 +2018,6 @@
}
void
-mac_create_ipc_msgmsg(struct ucred *cred, struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr,
- struct msg *msgptr)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(create_ipc_msgmsg, cred, msqkptr, &msqkptr->label,
- msgptr, &msgptr->label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_create_ipc_msgqueue(struct ucred *cred, struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(create_ipc_msgqueue, cred, msqkptr, &msqkptr->label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_create_ipc_sema(struct ucred *cred, struct semid_kernel *semakptr)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(create_ipc_sema, cred, semakptr, &semakptr->label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_create_ipc_shm(struct ucred *cred, struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(create_ipc_shm, cred, shmsegptr, &shmsegptr->label);
-}
-
-void
mac_create_socket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket)
{
@@ -2374,34 +2254,6 @@
&mp->mnt_fslabel);
}
-void
-mac_cleanup_ipc_msgmsg(struct msg *msgptr)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(cleanup_ipc_msgmsg, &msgptr->label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_cleanup_ipc_msgqueue(struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(cleanup_ipc_msgqueue, &msqkptr->label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_cleanup_ipc_sema(struct semid_kernel *semakptr)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(cleanup_ipc_sema, &semakptr->label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_cleanup_ipc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(cleanup_ipc_shm, &shmsegptr->label);
-}
-
int
mac_check_bpfdesc_receive(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct ifnet *ifnet)
{
@@ -2459,209 +2311,6 @@
}
int
-mac_check_ipc_msgmsq(struct ucred *cred, struct msg *msgptr,
- struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &msqkptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_msgmsq, cred, msgptr, msqkptr);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_msgrcv(struct ucred *cred, struct msg *msgptr)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &msqkptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_msgrcv, cred, msgptr);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_msgrmid(struct ucred *cred, struct msg *msgptr)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &msqkptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_msgrmid, cred, msgptr);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_msqget(struct ucred *cred, struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &msqkptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_msqget, cred, msqkptr);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_msqsnd(struct ucred *cred, struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &msqkptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_msqsnd, cred, msqkptr);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_msqrcv(struct ucred *cred, struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &msqkptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_msqrcv, cred, msqkptr);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_msqctl(struct ucred *cred, struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr,
- int cmd)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &msqkptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_msqctl, cred, msqkptr, cmd);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_semctl(struct ucred *cred, struct semid_kernel *semakptr,
- int cmd)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &semakptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_semctl, cred, semakptr, cmd);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_semget(struct ucred *cred, struct semid_kernel *semakptr)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &semakptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_semget, cred, semakptr);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_semop(struct ucred *cred, struct semid_kernel *semakptr,
- size_t accesstype)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &semakptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_semop, cred, semakptr, accesstype);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_shmat(struct ucred *cred, struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr,
- int shmflg)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &shmsegptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_shmat, cred, shmsegptr, shmflg);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_shmctl(struct ucred *cred, struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr,
- int cmd)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &shmsegptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_shmctl, cred, shmsegptr, cmd);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_shmdt(struct ucred *cred, struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &shmsegptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_shmdt, cred, shmsegptr);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_ipc_shmget(struct ucred *cred, struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr,
- int shmflg)
-{
- int error;
-
- if (!mac_enforce_sysv)
- return (0);
-
- //XXX: Should we also pass &shmsegptr->label ??
- MAC_CHECK(check_ipc_shmget, cred, shmsegptr, shmflg);
-
- return(error);
-}
-
-int
mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
{
int error;
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h#4 (text+ko) ====
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@
extern struct mac_policy_list_head mac_policy_list;
extern struct mac_policy_list_head mac_static_policy_list;
extern int mac_late;
+extern int mac_enforce_sysv;
+
/*
* MAC Framework global types and constants.
*/
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac/mac_sysv_msg.c#2 (text+ko) ====
@@ -1,12 +1,7 @@
/*-
- * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
- * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
- * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
- * TrustedBSD Project.
- *
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
@@ -34,673 +29,44 @@
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
-/*
- * Framework for extensible kernel access control. Kernel and userland
- * interface to the framework, policy registration and composition.
- */
-
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD: src/sys/kern/kern_mac.c,v 1.99 2003/09/29 18:35:17 rwatson Exp $");
#include "opt_mac.h"
-#include "opt_devfs.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/condvar.h>
-#include <sys/extattr.h>
-#include <sys/imgact.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/mac.h>
-#include <sys/module.h>
-#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/sbuf.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
-#include <sys/sysproto.h>
-#include <sys/sysent.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/pipe.h>
-#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/msg.h>
#include <sys/msg_msg.h>
-#include <sys/sem.h>
-#include <sys/shm.h>
-
-#include <vm/vm.h>
-#include <vm/pmap.h>
-#include <vm/vm_map.h>
-#include <vm/vm_object.h>
#include <sys/mac_policy.h>
-#include <fs/devfs/devfs.h>
-
-#include <net/bpfdesc.h>
-#include <net/if.h>
-#include <net/if_var.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
-
#include <security/mac/mac_internal.h>
-#ifdef MAC
-
-/*
- * Declare that the kernel provides MAC support, version 1. This permits
- * modules to refuse to be loaded if the necessary support isn't present,
- * even if it's pre-boot.
- */
-MODULE_VERSION(kernel_mac_support, 1);
-
-SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, mac, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
- "TrustedBSD MAC policy controls");
-
-#if MAC_MAX_SLOTS > 32
-#error "MAC_MAX_SLOTS too large"
-#endif
-
-static unsigned int mac_max_slots = MAC_MAX_SLOTS;
-static unsigned int mac_slot_offsets_free = (1 << MAC_MAX_SLOTS) - 1;
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, max_slots, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &mac_max_slots, 0, "");
-
-/*
- * Has the kernel started generating labeled objects yet? All read/write
- * access to this variable is serialized during the boot process. Following
- * the end of serialization, we don't update this flag; no locking.
- */
-int mac_late = 0;
-
-/*
- * Warn about EA transactions only the first time they happen.
- * Weak coherency, no locking.
- */
-static int ea_warn_once = 0;
-
-/*
- * Flag to indicate whether or not we should allocate label storage for
- * new mbufs. Since most dynamic policies we currently work with don't
- * rely on mbuf labeling, try to avoid paying the cost of mtag allocation
- * unless specifically notified of interest. One result of this is
- * that if a dynamically loaded policy requests mbuf labels, it must
- * be able to deal with a NULL label being returned on any mbufs that
- * were already in flight when the policy was loaded. Since the policy
- * already has to deal with uninitialized labels, this probably won't
- * be a problem. Note: currently no locking. Will this be a problem?
- */
-#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF
-static int mac_labelmbufs = 0;
-#endif
-
-static int mac_enforce_fs = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW,
- &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
-
-static int mac_enforce_network = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
- &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_network", &mac_enforce_network);
-
-static int mac_enforce_process = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_process, CTLFLAG_RW,
- &mac_enforce_process, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on inter-process operations");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_process", &mac_enforce_process);
-
-static int mac_enforce_socket = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_socket, CTLFLAG_RW,
- &mac_enforce_socket, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on socket operations");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_socket", &mac_enforce_socket);
-
-static int mac_enforce_sysv = 1;
+int mac_enforce_sysv = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_sysv, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_enforce_sysv, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on System V IPC objects");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_sysv", &mac_enforce_sysv);
-static int mac_enforce_vm = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_vm, CTLFLAG_RW,
- &mac_enforce_vm, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on vm operations");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_vm", &mac_enforce_vm);
-
-static int mac_mmap_revocation = 0;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation, CTLFLAG_RW,
- &mac_mmap_revocation, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files on subject "
- "relabel");
-
-static int mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation_via_cow, CTLFLAG_RW,
- &mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files via "
- "copy-on-write semantics, or by removing all write access");
-
#ifdef MAC_DEBUG
-SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, debug, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
- "TrustedBSD MAC debug info");
-
-static int mac_debug_label_fallback = 0;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_debug, OID_AUTO, label_fallback, CTLFLAG_RW,
- &mac_debug_label_fallback, 0, "Filesystems should fall back to fs label"
- "when label is corrupted.");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.debug_label_fallback",
- &mac_debug_label_fallback);
-
-SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac_debug, OID_AUTO, counters, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
- "TrustedBSD MAC object counters");
-
-static unsigned int nmacmbufs, nmaccreds, nmacifnets, nmacbpfdescs,
- nmacsockets, nmacmounts, nmactemp, nmacvnodes, nmacdevfsdirents,
- nmacipqs, nmacprocs, nmacipcmsgs, nmacipcmsqs,
- nmacipcsemas, nmacipcshms;
-
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, mbufs, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacmbufs, 0, "number of mbufs in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, creds, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmaccreds, 0, "number of ucreds in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ifnets, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacifnets, 0, "number of ifnets in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipqs, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacipqs, 0, "number of ipqs in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, bpfdescs, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacbpfdescs, 0, "number of bpfdescs in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, sockets, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacsockets, 0, "number of sockets in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, procs, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacprocs, 0, "number of procs in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, mounts, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacmounts, 0, "number of mounts in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, temp, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmactemp, 0, "number of temporary labels in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, vnodes, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacvnodes, 0, "number of vnodes in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, devfsdirents, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacdevfsdirents, 0, "number of devfs dirents inuse");
+static unsigned int nmacipcmsgs, nmacipcmsqs;
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipc_msgs, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacipcmsgs, 0, "number of sysv ipc messages inuse");
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipc_msqs, CTLFLAG_RD,
&nmacipcmsqs, 0, "number of sysv ipc message queue identifiers inuse");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipc_semas, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacipcsemas, 0, "number of sysv ipc semaphore identifiers inuse");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipc_shms, CTLFLAG_RD,
- &nmacipcshms, 0, "number of sysv ipc shm identifiers inuse");
-#endif
-
-static int mac_policy_register(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc);
-static int mac_policy_unregister(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc);
-
-static void mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade(struct ucred *cred,
- struct vnode *vp, int *prot);
-static void mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(struct thread *td,
- struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map);
-
-static void mac_destroy_socket_label(struct label *label);
-
-static int mac_setlabel_vnode_extattr(struct ucred *cred,
- struct vnode *vp, struct label *intlabel);
-
-MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MACTEMP, "mactemp", "MAC temporary label storage");
-
-/*
- * mac_static_policy_list holds a list of policy modules that are not
- * loaded while the system is "live", and cannot be unloaded. These
- * policies can be invoked without holding the busy count.
- *
- * mac_policy_list stores the list of dynamic policies. A busy count is
- * maintained for the list, stored in mac_policy_busy. The busy count
- * is protected by mac_policy_mtx; the list may be modified only
- * while the busy count is 0, requiring that the lock be held to
- * prevent new references to the list from being acquired. For almost
- * all operations, incrementing the busy count is sufficient to
- * guarantee consistency, as the list cannot be modified while the
- * busy count is elevated. For a few special operations involving a
- * change to the list of active policies, the mtx itself must be held.
- * A condition variable, mac_policy_cv, is used to signal potential
- * exclusive consumers that they should try to acquire the lock if a
- * first attempt at exclusive access fails.
- */
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
-static struct mtx mac_policy_mtx;
-static struct cv mac_policy_cv;
-static int mac_policy_count;
-#endif
-struct mac_policy_list_head mac_policy_list;
-struct mac_policy_list_head mac_static_policy_list;
-
-/*
- * We manually invoke WITNESS_WARN() to allow Witness to generate
- * warnings even if we don't end up ever triggering the wait at
- * run-time. The consumer of the exclusive interface must not hold
- * any locks (other than potentially Giant) since we may sleep for
- * long (potentially indefinite) periods of time waiting for the
- * framework to become quiescent so that a policy list change may
- * be made.
- */
-void
-mac_policy_grab_exclusive(void)
-{
-
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
- WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
- "mac_policy_grab_exclusive() at %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
- mtx_lock(&mac_policy_mtx);
- while (mac_policy_count != 0)
- cv_wait(&mac_policy_cv, &mac_policy_mtx);
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-mac_policy_assert_exclusive(void)
-{
-
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
- mtx_assert(&mac_policy_mtx, MA_OWNED);
- KASSERT(mac_policy_count == 0,
- ("mac_policy_assert_exclusive(): not exclusive"));
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-mac_policy_release_exclusive(void)
-{
-
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
- KASSERT(mac_policy_count == 0,
- ("mac_policy_release_exclusive(): not exclusive"));
- mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_mtx);
- cv_signal(&mac_policy_cv);
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-mac_policy_list_busy(void)
-{
-
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
- mtx_lock(&mac_policy_mtx);
- mac_policy_count++;
- mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_mtx);
-#endif
-}
-
-int
-mac_policy_list_conditional_busy(void)
-{
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
- int ret;
-
- mtx_lock(&mac_policy_mtx);
- if (!LIST_EMPTY(&mac_policy_list)) {
- mac_policy_count++;
- ret = 1;
- } else
- ret = 0;
- mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_mtx);
- return (ret);
-#else
- return (0);
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-mac_policy_list_unbusy(void)
-{
-
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
- mtx_lock(&mac_policy_mtx);
- mac_policy_count--;
- KASSERT(mac_policy_count >= 0, ("MAC_POLICY_LIST_LOCK"));
- if (mac_policy_count == 0)
- cv_signal(&mac_policy_cv);
- mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_mtx);
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialize the MAC subsystem, including appropriate SMP locks.
- */
-static void
-mac_init(void)
-{
-
- LIST_INIT(&mac_static_policy_list);
- LIST_INIT(&mac_policy_list);
-
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
- mtx_init(&mac_policy_mtx, "mac_policy_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
- cv_init(&mac_policy_cv, "mac_policy_cv");
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * For the purposes of modules that want to know if they were loaded
- * "early", set the mac_late flag once we've processed modules either
- * linked into the kernel, or loaded before the kernel startup.
- */
-static void
-mac_late_init(void)
-{
-
- mac_late = 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * After the policy list has changed, walk the list to update any global
- * flags. Currently, we support only one flag, and it's conditionally
- * defined; as a result, the entire function is conditional. Eventually,
- * the #else case might also iterate across the policies.
- */
-static void
-mac_policy_updateflags(void)
-{
-#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF
- struct mac_policy_conf *tmpc;
- int labelmbufs;
-
- mac_policy_assert_exclusive();
-
- labelmbufs = 0;
- LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) {
- if (tmpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS)
- labelmbufs++;
- }
- LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) {
- if (tmpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS)
- labelmbufs++;
- }
- mac_labelmbufs = (labelmbufs != 0);
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Allow MAC policy modules to register during boot, etc.
- */
-int
-mac_policy_modevent(module_t mod, int type, void *data)
-{
- struct mac_policy_conf *mpc;
- int error;
-
- error = 0;
- mpc = (struct mac_policy_conf *) data;
-
-#ifdef MAC_STATIC
- if (mac_late) {
- printf("mac_policy_modevent: MAC_STATIC and late\n");
- return (EBUSY);
- }
-#endif
-
- switch (type) {
- case MOD_LOAD:
- if (mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_NOTLATE &&
- mac_late) {
- printf("mac_policy_modevent: can't load %s policy "
- "after booting\n", mpc->mpc_name);
- error = EBUSY;
- break;
- }
- error = mac_policy_register(mpc);
- break;
- case MOD_UNLOAD:
- /* Don't unregister the module if it was never registered. */
- if ((mpc->mpc_runtime_flags & MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED)
- != 0)
- error = mac_policy_unregister(mpc);
- else
- error = 0;
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- return (error);
-}
-
-static int
-mac_policy_register(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
-{
- struct mac_policy_conf *tmpc;
- int error, slot, static_entry;
-
- error = 0;
-
- /*
- * We don't technically need exclusive access while !mac_late,
- * but hold it for assertion consistency.
- */
- mac_policy_grab_exclusive();
-
- /*
- * If the module can potentially be unloaded, or we're loading
- * late, we have to stick it in the non-static list and pay
- * an extra performance overhead. Otherwise, we can pay a
- * light locking cost and stick it in the static list.
- */
- static_entry = (!mac_late &&
- !(mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK));
-
- if (static_entry) {
- LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) {
- if (strcmp(tmpc->mpc_name, mpc->mpc_name) == 0) {
- error = EEXIST;
- goto out;
- }
- }
- } else {
- LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) {
- if (strcmp(tmpc->mpc_name, mpc->mpc_name) == 0) {
- error = EEXIST;
- goto out;
- }
- }
- }
- if (mpc->mpc_field_off != NULL) {
- slot = ffs(mac_slot_offsets_free);
- if (slot == 0) {
- error = ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- slot--;
- mac_slot_offsets_free &= ~(1 << slot);
- *mpc->mpc_field_off = slot;
- }
- mpc->mpc_runtime_flags |= MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED;
-
- /*
- * If we're loading a MAC module after the framework has
- * initialized, it has to go into the dynamic list. If
- * we're loading it before we've finished initializing,
- * it can go into the static list with weaker locker
- * requirements.
- */
- if (static_entry)
- LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&mac_static_policy_list, mpc, mpc_list);
- else
- LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&mac_policy_list, mpc, mpc_list);
-
- /* Per-policy initialization. */
- if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_init != NULL)
- (*(mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_init))(mpc);
- mac_policy_updateflags();
-
- printf("Security policy loaded: %s (%s)\n", mpc->mpc_fullname,
- mpc->mpc_name);
-
-out:
- mac_policy_release_exclusive();
- return (error);
-}
-
-static int
-mac_policy_unregister(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
-{
-
- /*
- * If we fail the load, we may get a request to unload. Check
- * to see if we did the run-time registration, and if not,
- * silently succeed.
- */
- mac_policy_grab_exclusive();
- if ((mpc->mpc_runtime_flags & MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED) == 0) {
- mac_policy_release_exclusive();
- return (0);
>>> TRUNCATED FOR MAIL (1000 lines) <<<
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