PERFORCE change 35437 for review
Robert Watson
rwatson at FreeBSD.org
Sun Aug 3 21:26:27 GMT 2003
http://perforce.freebsd.org/chv.cgi?CH=35437
Change 35437 by rwatson at rwatson_paprika on 2003/08/03 14:25:56
More notes on file permissions and UFS protections, to be
fleshed out into text later.
Affected files ...
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/developers-handbook/secarch/chapter.sgml#8 edit
Differences ...
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/developers-handbook/secarch/chapter.sgml#8 (text+ko) ====
@@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@
</sect4>
<sect4 id="secarch-ufsmode">
- <title>UFS Mode Field</title>
+ <title>UFS Owner and Mode Fields</title>
<para></para>
@@ -1392,20 +1392,35 @@
generally implemented only at open() for files, per operation for
directories
-file
- write
- read
- execute
+file, device, fifo
+ write write/append file contents, truncate file, map writable
+ read read file contents, map readable
+ execute permission to execve()
apply to data of file; also user namespace extended attributes
system namespace extended attributes require suser
- admin limited to owner, suser
+ admin limited to owner
+
+ additional protections may apply to device objects as implemented
+ by the device driver.
+
+socket
+ write (connect)
+ read unused
+ execute unused
+
+symlink
+ permissions have no effect on symlink operations
directory
- write
- read
- execute
+ write (insert, delete)
+ read (list)
+ execute (lookup)
+ sticky bit special protection for objects in directory
+ must be object owner or directory owner to
+ delete/replace entries in the directory,
+ regardless of permissions
apply to data of directory; also user namespace extended attributes
system namespace extended attributes require suser
@@ -1467,6 +1482,29 @@
requested creation mode for the operation, and the protections on
the parent directory (specifically, the default ACL).
+New UFS file system objects will be assigned the effective uid
+of the authorizing credential as their owner uid.
+
+New UFS file system objects will be assigned a group equal to the
+group of the directory in which the object is created.
+
+Setgid flag removed from new file system objects if the creating
+credential is not a member of the group.
+
+Processes requesting the creation of the file provide two elements
+used to calculate the new object's mode bits: an explicit creation
+mode argument to the call creating the object, and an implicit
+process umask, set by the umask() system call, which masks the
+creation mode.
+
+In addition, the setgid bit will not be included in the mode of
+a new object even if requested, if the object does not have a
+group that appears in the process credential effective or extended
+group.
+
+The sticky bit is only permitted for directory objects if the
+authorizing credential is not privileged.
+
Note: composition of default ACL, umask, and cmode, are as defined
in POSIX.1e; some other systems use alternative compositions.
</para>
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