PERFORCE change 35396 for review

[Robert Watson]

http://perforce.freebsd.org/chv.cgi?CH=35396

Change 35396 by rwatson at rwatson_paprika on 2003/08/02 10:04:50

	Updates to the MAC section of the Sec Arch.

Affected files ...

.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/developers-handbook/secarch/chapter.sgml#3 edit

Differences ...

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/developers-handbook/secarch/chapter.sgml#3 (text+ko) ====

@@ -2752,10 +2752,23 @@
       <title>Mandatory Access Control</title>
       <para>As of FreeBSD 5.0, experimental support for Mandatory Access
 	Control (MAC) provided by the TrustedBSD Project has been
-	integrated into the operating system.  The kernel supports a
-	flexible MAC Framework permitting policy modules to augment
-	the kernel security policy, as well as maintain security
-	labeling information on a variety of system objects.</para>
+	integrated into the operating system.
+	The kernel may be compiled with <literal>options MAC</literal>
+	to enable a pluggable labeled access control framework.  
+	The MAC Framework permits policy modules to augment the kernel
+	security policy, as well as maintain security labeling
+	information on a variety of system objects.
+	Common infrastructure provided by the Framework include
+	the ability to augment critical system security decisions,
+	a policy-agnostic security labeling service, composition of
+	simultaneously loaded policies, and system calls and APIs for
+	application management of labels.
+	The MAC Framework is capable of supporting policy modules
+	implementing a broad range of access control policies, including
+	hardening changes to the base FreeBSD policy, Biba integrity,
+	MLS confidentiality, RBAC, Type Enforcement, and many
+	more.</para>
+	
 <para>
 mac.conf:
 	default MAC labels to show for various objects, including
@@ -2770,30 +2783,114 @@
 third party models, including sebsd
 </para>
 
-<para>
-Common facilities for MAC policies, including labeling, access control,
-labeling, utilities, etc.
-</para>
+      <variablelist>
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term>mac_biba</term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>Biba data integrity policy; makes use of information
+	      labeling and flow control to prevent violation of system
+	      integrity constraints.
+	      Security labels on subjects and objects include both
+	      hierarchal (ordered) and non-hierarchal (compartmented)
+	      components.</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
+
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term>mac_bsdextended</term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>File system firewall policy; maintains a rule set
+	      placing restrictions on file system access based on
+	      existing security parameters, such as process uid, gids,
+	      and file owner and group.</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
+
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term>mac_ifoff</term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>Interface silencing policy; controls the incoming and
+	      outgoing flow of packets via network interfaces.</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
+
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term>mac_lomac</term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>Low-Watermark Mandatory Access Control (LOMAC) policy;
+	      as with Biba, a labeled integrity policy, but making use
+	      of floating subject labels which downgrade based on
+	      access to information of lower integrity.</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
+
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term>mac_mls</term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>Multi-Level Security (MLS) confidentiality policy;
+	      implements the classing MLS MAC policy, providing both
+	      hierarchal levels and non-hierarchal compartments to
+	      control the flow of information to unauthorized
+	      parties.</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
+
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term>mac_none</term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>Null policy used for performance testing purposes.</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
+
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term>mac_partition</term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>Simple system partition policy controlling inter-process
+	      visibility based on administrator-defined security
+	      partitions.</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
+
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term>mac_portacl</term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>IP port access control list policy; implements controls
+	      on system calls requesting the assignment of specific
+	      UDP and TCP port numbers.
+	      Intended for use with systems that no longer require root
+	      privilege to bind low port numbers.</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
+
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term>mac_seeotheruids</term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>Inter-process visibility policy; controls whether users
+	      are permitted to see (and otherwise interact) with processes
+	      owned by other users.</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
 
-<para>
-various security models:
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term>mac_stub</term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>Prototype policy containing stub implementations of all
+	      entry points; intended for use by developers of new system
+	      policies.</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
 
-mac(4)                   - Mandatory Access Control
-mac_biba(4)              - Biba data integrity policy
-mac_bsdextended(4)       - file system firewall policy
-mac_ifoff(4)             - interface silencing policy
-mac_lomac(4)             - Low-watermark Mandatory Access Control data integrity policy
-mac_mls(4)               - Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy
-mac_none(4)              - sample MAC policy module
-mac_partition(4)         - process partition policy
-mac_portacl(4)           - network port access control policy
-mac_seeotheruids(4)      - simple policy controlling whether users see other users
-mac_test(4)              - MAC framework testing policy
-</para>
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term>mac_test</term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>Internal assertion testing policy for the MAC Framework;
+	      intended to assist in the testing of the correctness of the
+	      Framework.</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
+      </variablelist>
     </sect2>
-
   </sect1>
-
 </chapter>
 
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