PERFORCE change 20373 for review
Robert Watson
rwatson at freebsd.org
Tue Oct 29 21:17:58 GMT 2002
http://perforce.freebsd.org/chv.cgi?CH=20373
Change 20373 by rwatson at rwatson_tislabs on 2002/10/29 13:17:19
Permit the MAC Framework to mediate access to kernel
environment interfaces kenv_{dump,get,set,unset}.
Affected files ...
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/kern_environment.c#6 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/kern_mac.c#338 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac.h#203 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac_policy.h#155 edit
Differences ...
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/kern_environment.c#6 (text+ko) ====
@@ -36,11 +36,14 @@
* the kernel.
*/
+#include "opt_mac.h"
+
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/queue.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
+#include <sys/mac.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
@@ -90,6 +93,11 @@
error = 0;
if (SCARG(uap, what) == KENV_DUMP) {
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_kenv_dump(td->td_ucred);
+ if (error)
+ return (error);
+#endif
len = 0;
/* Return the size if called with a NULL buffer */
if (SCARG(uap, value) == NULL) {
@@ -131,6 +139,11 @@
switch (SCARG(uap, what)) {
case KENV_GET:
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_kenv_get(td->td_ucred, name);
+ if (error)
+ goto done;
+#endif
value = getenv(name);
if (value == NULL) {
error = ENOENT;
@@ -159,10 +172,19 @@
free(value, M_TEMP);
goto done;
}
- setenv(name, value);
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_kenv_set(td->td_ucred, name, value);
+ if (error == 0)
+#endif
+ setenv(name, value);
free(value, M_TEMP);
break;
case KENV_UNSET:
+#ifdef MAC
+ error = mac_check_kenv_unset(td->td_ucred, name);
+ if (error)
+ goto done;
+#endif
error = unsetenv(name);
if (error)
error = ENOENT;
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/kern_mac.c#338 (text+ko) ====
@@ -843,6 +843,22 @@
mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_check_ifnet_transmit =
mpe->mpe_function;
break;
+ case MAC_CHECK_KENV_DUMP:
+ mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_check_kenv_dump =
+ mpe->mpe_function;
+ break;
+ case MAC_CHECK_KENV_GET:
+ mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_check_kenv_get =
+ mpe->mpe_function;
+ break;
+ case MAC_CHECK_KENV_SET:
+ mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_check_kenv_set =
+ mpe->mpe_function;
+ break;
+ case MAC_CHECK_KENV_UNSET:
+ mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_check_kenv_unset =
+ mpe->mpe_function;
+ break;
case MAC_CHECK_MOUNT_STAT:
mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_check_mount_stat =
mpe->mpe_function;
@@ -2801,6 +2817,58 @@
}
int
+mac_check_kenv_dump(struct ucred *cred)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_system)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_dump, cred);
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kenv_get(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_system)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_get, cred, name);
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kenv_set(struct ucred *cred, char *name, char *value)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_system)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_set, cred, name, value);
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
+mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ if (!mac_enforce_system)
+ return (0);
+
+ MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_unset, cred, name);
+
+ return (error);
+}
+
+int
mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
{
int error;
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac.h#203 (text+ko) ====
@@ -240,6 +240,10 @@
int mac_check_bpfdesc_receive(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct ifnet *ifnet);
int mac_check_cred_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2);
int mac_check_ifnet_transmit(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *m);
+int mac_check_kenv_dump(struct ucred *cred);
+int mac_check_kenv_get(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
+int mac_check_kenv_set(struct ucred *cred, char *name, char *value);
+int mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
int mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp);
int mac_check_pipe_ioctl(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
unsigned long cmd, void *data);
==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac_policy.h#155 (text+ko) ====
@@ -275,6 +275,11 @@
int (*mpo_check_ifnet_transmit)(struct ifnet *ifnet,
struct label *ifnetlabel, struct mbuf *m,
struct label *mbuflabel);
+ int (*mpo_check_kenv_dump)(struct ucred *cred);
+ int (*mpo_check_kenv_get)(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
+ int (*mpo_check_kenv_set)(struct ucred *cred, char *name,
+ char *value);
+ int (*mpo_check_kenv_unset)(struct ucred *cred, char *name);
int (*mpo_check_mount_stat)(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
struct label *mntlabel);
int (*mpo_check_pipe_ioctl)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
@@ -498,6 +503,10 @@
MAC_CHECK_CRED_VISIBLE,
MAC_CHECK_IFNET_RELABEL,
MAC_CHECK_IFNET_TRANSMIT,
+ MAC_CHECK_KENV_DUMP,
+ MAC_CHECK_KENV_GET,
+ MAC_CHECK_KENV_SET,
+ MAC_CHECK_KENV_UNSET,
MAC_CHECK_MOUNT_STAT,
MAC_CHECK_PIPE_IOCTL,
MAC_CHECK_PIPE_POLL,
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