PERFORCE change 15122 for review

[Robert Watson]

http://people.freebsd.org/~peter/p4db/chv.cgi?CH=15122

Change 15122 by rwatson at rwatson_paprika on 2002/07/29 07:24:09

	Re-sort the entry points to more closely match the canonical
	order in mac_policy.h.

Affected files ...

.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac.h#133 edit

Differences ...

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac.h#133 (text+ko) ====

@@ -248,8 +248,6 @@
 void	mac_destroy_mbuf(struct mbuf *);
 void	mac_destroy_mount(struct mount *);
 void	mac_destroy_vnode(struct vnode *);
-void	mac_relabel_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
-	    struct label *newlabel);
 
 /* Non-authorizational event hooks. */
 void	mac_execve_transition(struct ucred *old, struct ucred *new,
@@ -258,10 +256,23 @@
 
 /* Authorizational event hooks. */
 int	mac_check_bpfdesc_receive(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct ifnet *ifnet);
+int	mac_check_cred_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2);
+int	mac_check_ifnet_transmit(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *m);
 int	mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp);
 int	mac_check_pipe_op(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe, int op);
 int	mac_check_pipe_ioctl(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
 	    unsigned long cmd, void *data);
+int	mac_check_proc_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc);
+int	mac_check_proc_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc);
+int	mac_check_proc_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc,
+	    int signum);
+int	mac_check_socket_bind(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
+	    struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
+int	mac_check_socket_connect(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
+	    struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
+int	mac_check_socket_listen(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
+int	mac_check_socket_receive(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m);
+int	mac_check_socket_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
 int	mac_check_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
 	    int flags);
 int	mac_check_vnode_chdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp);
@@ -363,26 +374,11 @@
 int	mac_fragment_matches_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq);
 void	mac_update_ipq_from_fragment(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq);
 
-int	mac_check_ifnet_transmit(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *m);
-
-int	mac_check_socket_bind(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
-	    struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
-int	mac_check_socket_connect(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
-	    struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
-int	mac_check_socket_listen(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
-int	mac_check_socket_receive(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m);
-
-/* Hooks for the proc-based "can"-checks. */
-int	mac_check_cred_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2);
-int	mac_check_proc_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc);
-int	mac_check_proc_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc);
-int	mac_check_proc_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc,
-	    int signum);
-int	mac_check_socket_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
-
 /* Calls to help various file systems implement labeling using EAs. */
 struct vop_refreshlabel_args;
 struct vop_setlabel_args;
+void	mac_relabel_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+	    struct label *newlabel);
 int	vop_stdcreatevnode_ea(struct vnode *dvp, struct vnode *tvp,
 	    struct ucred *cred);
 int	vop_stdrefreshlabel_ea(struct vop_refreshlabel_args *ap);
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