svn commit: r527003 - head/security/vuxml
Tijl Coosemans
tijl at FreeBSD.org
Mon Feb 24 17:21:38 UTC 2020
Author: tijl
Date: Mon Feb 24 17:21:36 2020
New Revision: 527003
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/527003
Log:
Document Mbed TLS vulnerabilities 2019-12 and 2020-02.
Security: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2019-12
Security: https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-02
Modified:
head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
==============================================================================
--- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Mon Feb 24 17:13:34 2020 (r527002)
+++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Mon Feb 24 17:21:36 2020 (r527003)
@@ -58,6 +58,69 @@ Notes:
* Do not forget port variants (linux-f10-libxml2, libxml2, etc.)
-->
<vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1">
+ <vuln vid="056ea107-5729-11ea-a2f3-001cc0382b2f">
+ <topic>Mbed TLS -- Cache attack against RSA key import in SGX</topic>
+ <affects>
+ <package>
+ <name>mbedtls</name>
+ <range><lt>2.16.5</lt></range>
+ </package>
+ </affects>
+ <description>
+ <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+ <p>Janos Follath reports:</p>
+ <blockquote cite="https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-02">
+ <p>If Mbed TLS is running in an SGX enclave and the adversary has
+ control of the main operating system, they can launch a side
+ channel attack to recover the RSA private key when it is being
+ imported.</p>
+ <p>The attack only requires access to fine grained measurements to
+ cache usage. Therefore the attack might be applicable to a scenario
+ where Mbed TLS is running in TrustZone secure world and the
+ attacker controls the normal world or possibly when Mbed TLS is
+ part of a hypervisor and the adversary has full control of a guest
+ OS.</p>
+ </blockquote>
+ </body>
+ </description>
+ <references>
+ <url>https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-02</url>
+ </references>
+ <dates>
+ <discovery>2020-02-18</discovery>
+ <entry>2020-02-24</entry>
+ </dates>
+ </vuln>
+
+ <vuln vid="b70b880f-5727-11ea-a2f3-001cc0382b2f">
+ <topic>Mbed TLS -- Side channel attack on ECDSA</topic>
+ <affects>
+ <package>
+ <name>mbedtls</name>
+ <range><lt>2.16.4</lt></range>
+ </package>
+ </affects>
+ <description>
+ <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+ <p>Janos Follath reports:</p>
+ <blockquote cite="https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2019-12">
+ <p>Our bignum implementation is not constant time/constant trace, so
+ side channel attacks can retrieve the blinded value, factor it (as
+ it is smaller than RSA keys and not guaranteed to have only large
+ prime factors), and then, by brute force, recover the key.</p>
+ </blockquote>
+ </body>
+ </description>
+ <references>
+ <url>https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2019-12</url>
+ <cvename>CVE-2019-18222</cvename>
+ </references>
+ <dates>
+ <discovery>2019-10-25</discovery>
+ <entry>2020-02-24</entry>
+ </dates>
+ </vuln>
+
<vuln vid="8e3f1812-54d9-11ea-8d49-d4c9ef517024">
<topic>WeeChat -- Multiple vulnerabilities</topic>
<affects>
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