PERFORCE change 148306 for review

[Robert Watson]

http://perforce.freebsd.org/chv.cgi?CH=148306

Change 148306 by rwatson at rwatson_freebsd_capabilities on 2008/08/25 00:22:52

	Teach the audit subsystem about capability rights masks, which are
	encoded as a 64-bit argument token.
	
	Audit various capability system calls.
	
	Audit fexecve(2) (to merge to SVN).

Affected files ...

.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/kern/sys_capability.c#19 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/security/audit/audit.h#4 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c#5 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c#4 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h#5 edit

Differences ...

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/kern/sys_capability.c#19 (text+ko) ====

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 #include "opt_capabilities.h"
 
 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
-__FBSDID("$P4: //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/kern/sys_capability.c#18 $");
+__FBSDID("$P4: //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/kern/sys_capability.c#19 $");
 
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/capability.h>
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@
 #include <sys/systm.h>
 #include <sys/ucred.h>
 
+#include <security/audit/audit.h>
+
 #include <vm/uma.h>
 
 #ifdef CAPABILITIES
@@ -228,6 +230,8 @@
 	struct file *fp, *fp_cap, *fp_object;
 	int error, fd_cap;
 
+	AUDIT_ARG(fd, uap->fd);
+	AUDIT_ARG(rights, uap->rights);
 	if ((uap->rights | CAP_MASK_VALID) != CAP_MASK_VALID)
 		return (EINVAL);
 
@@ -309,6 +313,7 @@
 	struct file *fp;
 	int error;
 
+	AUDIT_ARG(fd, uap->fd);
 	error = fgetcap(td, uap->fd, &fp);
 	if (error)
 		return (error);

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/security/audit/audit.h#4 (text) ====

@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
 #define	ARG_IOVECSTR		0x0000800000000000ULL
 #define	ARG_ARGV		0x0001000000000000ULL
 #define	ARG_ENVV		0x0002000000000000ULL
+#define	ARG_RIGHTS		0x0004000000000000ULL
 #define	ARG_NONE		0x0000000000000000ULL
 #define	ARG_ALL			0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL
 
@@ -171,6 +172,7 @@
 void	 audit_arg_file(struct proc *p, struct file *fp);
 void	 audit_arg_argv(char *argv, int argc, int length);
 void	 audit_arg_envv(char *envv, int envc, int length);
+void	 audit_arg_rights(cap_rights_t rights);
 void	 audit_sysclose(struct thread *td, int fd);
 void	 audit_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest);
 void	 audit_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred);

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/security/audit/audit_arg.c#5 (text) ====

@@ -823,6 +823,19 @@
 	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_ENVV);
 }
 
+void
+audit_arg_rights(cap_rights_t rights)
+{
+	struct kaudit_record *ar;
+
+	ar = currecord();
+	if (ar == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ar->k_ar.ar_arg_rights = rights;
+	ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_RIGHTS);
+}
+
 /*
  * The close() system call uses it's own audit call to capture the path/vnode
  * information because those pieces are not easily obtained within the system

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/security/audit/audit_bsm.c#4 (text) ====

@@ -762,6 +762,7 @@
 		EXTATTR_TOKENS;
 		break;
 
+	case AUE_FEXECVE:
 	case AUE_EXECVE:
 		if (ARG_IS_VALID(kar, ARG_ARGV)) {
 			tok = au_to_exec_args(ar->ar_arg_argv,
@@ -1416,6 +1417,28 @@
 		}
 		break;
 
+	case AUE_CAP_NEW:
+		if (ARG_IS_VALID(kar, ARG_FD)) {
+			tok = au_to_arg32(1, "fd", ar->ar_arg_fd);
+			kau_write(rec, tok);
+		}
+		if (ARG_IS_VALID(kar, ARG_RIGHTS)) {
+			tok = au_to_arg64(2, "rights", ar->ar_arg_rights);
+			kau_write(rec, tok);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case AUE_CAP_GETRIGHTS:
+		if (ARG_IS_VALID(kar, ARG_FD)) {
+			tok = au_to_arg32(1, "fd", ar->ar_arg_fd);
+			kau_write(rec, tok);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case AUE_CAP_ENTER:
+	case AUE_CAP_GETMODE:
+		break;
+
 	case AUE_NULL:
 	default:
 		printf("BSM conversion requested for unknown event %d\n",

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/capabilities/src/sys/security/audit/audit_private.h#5 (text) ====

@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@
 	int			ar_arg_exitstatus;
 	int			ar_arg_exitretval;
 	struct sockaddr_storage ar_arg_sockaddr;
+	cap_rights_t		ar_arg_rights;
 };
 
 /*