http subversion URLs should be discontinued in favor of https URLs

[Poul-Henning Kamp]

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In message <86d13kgnfh.fsf at desk.des.no>, =?utf-8?Q?Dag-Erling_Sm=C3=B8rgrav?= w
rites:
>"Poul-Henning Kamp" <phk at phk.freebsd.dk> writes:
>> The only realistic way for the FreeBSD project to implement end-to-end
>> trust, is HTTPS with a self-signed cert, distributed and verified
>> using the projects PGP-trust-mesh and strong social network.
>
>Your suggestion does not remove implicit and possibly misplaced trust,
>it just moves it from one place to another.  Instead of trusting a
>certificate authority and DNS, you trust the source of the public key,
>and probably also DNS.  As always, it boils down to a) key distribution
>is hard and b) what's your threat model?

I don't think I agree with any of that ?

With respect to authenticity of the FreeBSD SVN repo I cannot
imagine anybody else being even one percent as qualified and
trustworth as the FreeBSD projects own core-team.

In particular I would never trust any "In the CA-racket for the
money" organization to do so.

If you are worried that the FreeBSD project "staff" cannot
handle a root-cert competently, then the exposure is no
smaller or larger than if it was a CA-signed cert they fumbled.

Trusting DNS doesn't apply it if the project root-cert was
stored on my local machine after I used my best judgement of PGP
signatures to conclude that it was authentic.

And I don't really see distribution of this particular key being
difficult at all:  We already PGP sign release checksums for
authenticity and it the FreeBSD root-cert is just another file to
get same treatment.

Poul-Henning

-- 
Poul-Henning Kamp       | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
phk at FreeBSD.ORG         | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer       | BSD since 4.3-tahoe    
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.