Pre-boot authentication / geli-aware bootcode

[Matt Piechota]

On 06/15/2012 01:40 PM, Simon L. B. Nielsen wrote:
> On Jun 11, 2012 1:22 AM, "Robert Simmons"<rsimmons0 at gmail.com>  wrote:
>> Would it be possible to make FreeBSD's bootcode aware of geli encrypted
> volumes?
>> I would like to enter the password and begin decryption so that the
>> kernel and /boot are inside the encrypted volume.  Ideally the only
>> unencrypted area of the disk would be the gpt protected mbr and the
>> bootcode.
>>
>> I know that Truecrypt is able to do something like this with its
>> truecrypt boot loader, is something like this possible with FreeBSD
>> without using Truecrypt?
> I just booted off a USB flash key. Then your entire drive can be encrypted.
>

While true, the point (to me at least) is that with your kernel (and in 
Linux's case, initrd) in the clear it's possible for someone to bury a 
trojan of some sort in there waiting for you to boot up and start doing 
something nefarious (open backdoors, keylogging, etc.). I suppose you 
could check hashes of the kernel stuff and whatnot on booting to see if 
they haven't been modified, but that's not fool-proof either. That's 
obviously some pretty cloak and dagger stuff, but the company I work for 
requires full disk encryption. I've never actually asked if /boot 
counts, somewhat fearing the answer and resulting hassle from the 
largely paper-pushing security types.

The USB key method isn't bad, but it realistically only adds obfuscation 
unless you keep your laptop and the key separate. Knowing myself, I'd 
forget one or the other fairly often. :)

-- 
Matt Piechota