PAM exec patch to allow PAM_AUTHTOK to be exported.

[Dan Lukes]

Dag-Erling Smørgrav napsal/wrote, On 05/20/07 19:10:
> "Zane C.B." <v.velox at vvelox.net> writes:
>> Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des at des.no> writes:
>>> Your patch opens a gaping security hole.  Sensitive information
>>> should never be placed in the environment.
>> Unless I am missing something, this is only dangerous if one is doing
>> something stupid with what ever is being executed by pam_exec.
> 
> Environment variables may be visible to other processes and users
> through e.g. /proc.

	Many sensitive informations can be accessible via /dev/kmem but the 
default mode of the device doesn't allow regular user access.

	We trust the responsible administrator he doesn't load the mem.ko 
module and change the mode/ownership of /dev/kmem the way that open a hole.

	So we shall trust the same administrator he doesn't load the procfs.ko 
and mount /proc creating the security hole this way.

	Please note I agree with the conclusion - the offered patch shall be 
rejected. I disagree with explanation only. It's not as simple as 
presented.


						Dan



-- 
Dan Lukes                                               SISAL MFF UK
AKA: dan at obluda.cz, dan at freebsd.cz, dan at (kolej.)mff.cuni.cz