Integrity checking NANOBSD images

[Poul-Henning Kamp]

In message <44B4010E.7010809 at mac.com>, Chuck Swiger writes:

>Checksumming the device image is a fine way of checking the integrity of it, 
>assuming it is read-only.  The only thing you might want to do is use two or 
>three checksum algorithms (ie, use sha256 and md5 and something else), so that 
>someone can't create a new image which matches the sha256 checksum of the 
>original.

A much better idea is to send a random "salt" to be prepended to
the disk image before it is run through sha256, that would prevent
the attacker from running sha256 and any other algorithm you
could care for on the image, store the results and return them
with trojans.

Copying the sha256 binary over is no guarantee against a kernel
embedded trojan.

But then again, how paranoid one has to be is a matter of preference.

-- 
Poul-Henning Kamp       | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
phk at FreeBSD.ORG         | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer       | BSD since 4.3-tahoe    
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.