Kernel panic on FreeBSD 9.0-beta2

dave jones s.dave.jones at gmail.com
Sat Oct 1 06:15:47 UTC 2011


On Fri, Sep 30, 2011 at 9:41 PM, Robert Watson wrote:
>
> On Wed, 28 Sep 2011, Mikolaj Golub wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 26 Sep 2011 16:12:55 +0200 K. Macy wrote:
>>
>> KM> Sorry, didn't look at the images (limited bw), I've seen something KM>
>> like this before in timewait. This "can't happen" with UDP so will be KM>
>> interested in learning more about the bug.
>>
>> The panic can be easily triggered by this:
>
> Hi:
>
> Just catching up on this thread.  I think the analysis here is generally
> right: in 9.0, you're much more likely to see an inpcb with its in_socket
> pointer cleared in the hash list than in prior releases, and
> in_pcbbind_setup() trips over this.
>
> However, at least on first glance (and from the perspective of invariants
> here), I think the bug is actualy that in_pcbbind_setup() is asking
> in_pcblookup_local() for an inpcb and then access the returned inpcb's
> in_socket pointer without acquiring a lock on the inpcb.  Structurally, it
> can't acquire this lock for lock order reasons -- it already holds the lock
> on its own inpcb.  Therefore, we should only access fields that are safe to
> follow in an inpcb when you hold a reference via the hash lock and not a
> lock on the inpcb itself, which appears generally OK (+/-) for all the
> fields in that clause but the t->inp_socket->so_options dereference.
>
> A preferred fix would cache the SO_REUSEPORT flag in an inpcb-layer field,
> such as inp_flags2, giving us access to its value without having to walk
> into the attached (or not) socket.
>
> This raises another structural question, which is whether we need a new
> inp_foo flags field that is protected explicitly by the hash lock, and not
> by the inpcb lock, which could hold fields relevant to address binding.  I
> don't think we need to solve that problem in this context, as a slightly
> race on SO_REUSEPORT is likely acceptable.
>
> The suggested fix does perform the desired function of explicitly detaching
> the inpcb from the hash list before the socket is disconnected from the
> inpcb. However, it's incomplete in that the invariant that's being broken is
> also relied on for other protocols (such as raw sockets).  The correct
> invariant is that inp_socket is safe to follow unconditionally if an inpcb
> is locked and INP_DROPPED isn't set -- the bug is in "locked" not in
> "INP_DROPPED", which is why I think this is the wrong fix, even though it
> prevents a panic :-).

Hello Robert,

Thank you for taking your valuable time to find out the problem.
Since I don't have idea about network internals, would you have a patch
about this? I'd be glad to test it, thanks again.

> Robert

Best regards,
Dave.


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