WPA2 attack?

[Igor Mozolevsky]

On 16 October 2017 at 14:51, George Mitchell <george+freebsd at m5p.com> wrote:

> Is our community working on mitigating this problem?
> https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/
> 10/severe-flaw-in-wpa2-protocol-leaves-wi-fi-traffic-
> open-to-eavesdropping/


It's quite FUD-dy, from their conference paper at
https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/ccs2017.pdf:

3.2 The Key Reinstallation Attack

Our key reinstallation attack is now easy to spot: because the supplicant
still accepts retransmissions of message 3, even when it is
in the PTK-DONE state, we can force a reinstallation of the PTK.
More precisely, we first establish a man-in-the-middle (MitM) position
between the supplicant and authenticator. We use this MitM
position to trigger retransmissions of message 3 by preventing
message 4 from arriving at the authenticator. As a result, it will
retransmit message 3, which causes the supplicant to reinstall an
already-in-use PTK.


-- 
Igor M.