GBDE not protecting the user

Michael W. Lucas mwlucas at michaelwlucas.com
Tue Oct 14 16:34:21 UTC 2014


On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 01:29:26PM +0100, RW wrote:
> You can overwrite the geli metadata on the end of the provider with dd.
> Preferably the whole partition if you want to be sure because anyone
> that's ever had access to the disk could have copied the metadata. 
> 
> If you are going to use a passphrase I'd recommend geli which has
> password strengthening. 

If Mallory is holding a gun to my head, I want the computer to say
"The passphrase entered by the user is correct, but the on-disk
decryption keys no longer exist. The user has cooperated fully. Please
don't shoot him."

GELI does not do this. It's designed for a different threat
model. That's not a problem, or a weakness.

GBDE does. Or, rather, it's supposed to. Hence this bug report.

It's an unusual use case, yes. But the people who need this
functionality REALLY need it.

==ml

-- 
Michael W. Lucas  -  mwlucas at michaelwlucas.com, Twitter @mwlauthor 
http://www.MichaelWLucas.com/, http://blather.MichaelWLucas.com/


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