Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-24:03.unbound

You are likely on your own here.

I’m surprised the base system kinit ever worked with OpenSSL in FIPS mode. Given the age of the Heimdal code (and I believe dependence on algorithms that should be deprecated), I would strongly suggest looking at Kerberos in ports as a path forward as they will likely be better supported with modern crypto.

Gordon

> On Apr 19, 2024, at 08:12, Wall, Stephen <stephen.wall@redcom.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>> 
>> FreeBSD-SA-24:03.unbound                                    Security Advisory
>> 
>> Topic:          Multiple vulnerabilities in unbound
> 
> Since upgrading to p6 in response to this SA, we've found that kinit has started
> failing for us. This looks to be due to aaf2c7fdb8 [1], when it attempts to load
> the legacy OpenSSL provider, which we do not install on our systems.
> Furthermore, it loads the default provider as well, which we specifically do not
> load when systems are configured for FIPS operation.
> 
> What is our exposure if we simple revert this commit?  Are there any CVE's
> associated with it?  Is there a way to disable the ciphers at build time that
> can trigger the segfaults?
> 
> Or am I on my own resolving this because we do not use the legacy provider (I.e.
> not a default system)?
> 
> Thanks for your consideration.
> 
> - Steve Wall
> 
> [1] https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?h=releng/14.0&id=aaf2c7fdb81a1dd9de9fc77c9313f4e60e68fa76