From nobody Thu Jan 19 22:09:31 2023 X-Original-To: ports@mlmmj.nyi.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mlmmj.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4NycHQ1jSXz2spvF for ; Thu, 19 Jan 2023 22:09:38 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from junchoon@dec.sakura.ne.jp) Received: from www121.sakura.ne.jp (www121.sakura.ne.jp [153.125.133.21]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4NycHN4Tqjz4K8M for ; Thu, 19 Jan 2023 22:09:36 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from junchoon@dec.sakura.ne.jp) Authentication-Results: mx1.freebsd.org; dkim=none; spf=none (mx1.freebsd.org: domain of junchoon@dec.sakura.ne.jp has no SPF policy when checking 153.125.133.21) smtp.mailfrom=junchoon@dec.sakura.ne.jp; dmarc=none Received: from kalamity.joker.local (123-1-88-210.area1b.commufa.jp [123.1.88.210]) (authenticated bits=0) by www121.sakura.ne.jp (8.16.1/8.16.1/[SAKURA-WEB]/20201212) with ESMTPA id 30JM9Wrh081109 for ; Fri, 20 Jan 2023 07:09:32 +0900 (JST) (envelope-from junchoon@dec.sakura.ne.jp) Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 07:09:31 +0900 From: Tomoaki AOKI To: ports@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Can security/ca_root_nss be retired? Message-Id: <20230120070931.4ef522dfa48b35ddac0c50ac@dec.sakura.ne.jp> In-Reply-To: References: <551458a3-665f-9f55-8ef9-1dd23e1e3aee@bluerosetech.com> <20230119210801.97b4eef4e21b96d40721b31a@dec.sakura.ne.jp> Organization: Junchoon corps X-Mailer: Sylpheed 3.7.0 (GTK+ 2.24.33; amd64-portbld-freebsd13.0) List-Id: Porting software to FreeBSD List-Archive: https://lists.freebsd.org/archives/freebsd-ports List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Sender: owner-freebsd-ports@freebsd.org X-BeenThere: freebsd-ports@freebsd.org Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spamd-Result: default: False [0.25 / 15.00]; SUBJECT_ENDS_QUESTION(1.00)[]; AUTH_NA(1.00)[]; NEURAL_HAM_SHORT(-0.99)[-0.986]; NEURAL_HAM_MEDIUM(-0.98)[-0.976]; MV_CASE(0.50)[]; NEURAL_HAM_LONG(-0.19)[-0.189]; MIME_GOOD(-0.10)[text/plain]; FROM_EQ_ENVFROM(0.00)[]; MIME_TRACE(0.00)[0:+]; R_DKIM_NA(0.00)[]; MLMMJ_DEST(0.00)[ports@freebsd.org]; R_SPF_NA(0.00)[no SPF record]; ASN(0.00)[asn:7684, ipnet:153.125.128.0/18, country:JP]; RCVD_TLS_LAST(0.00)[]; DMARC_NA(0.00)[sakura.ne.jp]; HAS_ORG_HEADER(0.00)[]; FROM_HAS_DN(0.00)[]; ARC_NA(0.00)[]; RCVD_VIA_SMTP_AUTH(0.00)[]; MID_RHS_MATCH_FROM(0.00)[]; TO_MATCH_ENVRCPT_ALL(0.00)[]; TO_DN_NONE(0.00)[]; PREVIOUSLY_DELIVERED(0.00)[ports@freebsd.org]; RCPT_COUNT_ONE(0.00)[1]; RCVD_COUNT_TWO(0.00)[2] X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 4NycHN4Tqjz4K8M X-Spamd-Bar: / X-ThisMailContainsUnwantedMimeParts: N On Thu, 19 Jan 2023 05:58:12 -0800 Mel Pilgrim wrote: > On 2023-01-19 4:08, Tomoaki AOKI wrote: > > On Thu, 19 Jan 2023 03:13:48 -0800 > > Mel Pilgrim wrote: > > > >> Given /usr/share/certs exists for all supported releases, is there any > >> reason to keep the ca_root_nss port? > > > > If everyone in the world uses LATEST main only, yes. > > But the assumption is clearly nonsense. > > > > Basically, commits to main are settled a while before MFC to stable > > branches, and MFS to releng branches needs additional settling days. > > > > If any certs happened to be non-reliable, this delay can cause, at > > worst, catastorphic scenario. > > > > If updates to certs are always promised to be "MFC after: now" and > > committed to ALL SUPPORTED BRANCHES AT ONCE, I have no objection. > > > > If not, keeping ca_root_nss port and updated ASAP with upstream should > > be mandatory. > > If ca_root_nss delivered the certs in the same format, sure, but that > monolithic file makes installing private CAs a hassle. > > I wonder if the script secteam uses to update the trust store in the src > tree could be turned into a periodic script that automatically updates > the trust store? Side-step the release engineering delay entirely by > turning trust store updates into a user task. With the approach, how can we avoid man-in-the-middle attack or something? Ports framework has checksum to avoid it, unless local admins intentionally disable it. Maybe adding a script to *Check if /usr/local/share/certs/ca-root-nss.crt is updated or not. *Extract individual certs from ca-root-nss.crt and update trust store. *Record current timestamp and hash of ca-root-nss.crt for next run. into ca-root-nss port, which can be run from cron or by hand, is needed? -- Tomoaki AOKI