Re:_Issues_I¢ve_had_with_Void
- In reply to: Sulev-Madis Silber : "Re:_Issues_I’ve_had_with_Void"
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Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2025 06:28:49 UTC
On 16 Apr, Sulev-Madis Silber wrote: > concern about getting backdoors info fbsd? >=20 > lets think like criminal here >=20 > it doesn't matter if contribution is anon or not. you could do both > anyway >=20 > as far as i know, i can't recall any cases like this here. maybe there > are hidden ones. feel free to correct >=20 > sadly there's nothing much one can do. it might still fall through > cracks. there are number of things one can do here to mitigate the > results. easiest would be to not run the same code everywhere. there > are different versions of fbsd that could be used. this also catches > accidental bugs. past that you need different oses. with different > oses you also need different libs. and this only makes it harder for > attack to succeed. but it's pretty hard always >=20 > so unsure if any changes would need to be made. it would be > ridiculously hard to verify all and this would essentially "ddos" the > whole thing >=20 > funnily, the recent unannounced ports system change around *kmod* > ports versioning got my attention. turned out to be legit change >=20 > then i mentioned to one port maintainer that changing up stream files > could be compromise too >=20 > now imagine if ports-upstream or base coder did this on purpose. > pretty hard >=20 > but i don't think that selfies with passports would help here. also > don't forget that there are legit reasons for anonymity. there are > weird states on this planet, etc. sure, same could have interest in > hacking too >=20 > but yeah. sadly, i wish fbsd would be more popular. but then, all bad > things come along too! i would still try to make fbsd more popular > tho, just too good to let them scare me >=20 > if successful attack would go through, just remove the code and the > attacker. and don't really blame one who got it in. similar to > libarchive case >=20 > fbsd is imho partially protected by it's pace. that's a drawback too. > if you push the pace, you get mistakes. i've seen many happen in fbsd > too. the problem was the pace, it has no name or face. in cba > resulting changes were good. but yeah i frown on this. someone got > annoyed i recall but that want never intent. idea was to keep quality. > i have questioned the way the libxo or wg got in, for example. good > ideas. way and pace, well... >=20 > but yes, all those concerns are actually valid and worth to think > about every so often >=20 > both accidental bugs and deliberate attacks perspective >=20 >=20 >=20 > On April 16, 2025 2:40:07 AM GMT+03:00, paige@paige.bio wrote: >>How high of a standard is there for contributions to the core >>components of FreeBSD (ie not ports) ? >> >>In my mind you guys would require some info about the contributor, as >>in somebody with a real name as opposed to a gamer tag right? >> >>I=A2m just kinda pissed off at the sorry ass way some linux distros have >>handled accountability and attribution, but particularly Void. My >>sense is, with FreeBSD it matters a lot given the investment of the >>people I know who have contributed to it over the years, I=A2m sure they >>would like to believe this still matters and it=A2s too important to >>allow contributions that can=A2t be definitively attributed to a real >>person. >> >>I get with ports it=A2s a bit different, and that the Linux kernel is >>not void. As a matter of fact I have a mirror of the ports distfiles >>(at least about 400gb of them) and it=A2s scary to think about but it=A2s >>at least a little less scary to me than the way Void handles package >>management because I feel like somebody is willing to endorse at least >>the core part of FreeBSD. >> >>Idk I guess I'm just starting to realize how much people don=A2t learn >>from some mistakes. A couple of years ago when sshd got backdoored, it >>was incredible to think that the attacker actually used coercive >>tactics, and I=A2m sure a lot of people were shaken by it but it just >>seems apparent to me that there are much simpler opportunities for >>attacks against various Linux distributions. >> >>=D3=F4=DC=EB=E8=E7=EA=E5 =E1=F0=FC =F4=EF iPhone =EC=EF=F5 >=20 It's also possible to Trojan the compiler or other parts of the toolchain. Done skillfully, it could silently propagate to new compiler releases. https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_ReflectionsonTrust= ingTrust.pdf