Re: Initial implementation of _FORTIFY_SOURCE
- Reply: Kyle Evans : "Re: Initial implementation of _FORTIFY_SOURCE"
- In reply to: Alexander Leidinger : "Re: Initial implementation of _FORTIFY_SOURCE"
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Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 16:34:15 UTC
On 5/14/24 07:47, Alexander Leidinger wrote:
> Am 2024-05-13 19:47, schrieb Kyle Evans:
>> Hi,
>>
>> As of 9bfd3b407 ("Add a build knob for _FORTIFY_SOURCE"), I've
>> imported an initial version of FORTIFY_SOURCE from FreeBSD.
>> FORTIFY_SOURCE is an improvement over classical SSP, doing
>> compiler-aided checking of stack object sizes to detect more
>> fine-grained stack overflow without relying on the randomized stack
>> canary just past the stack frame.
>
> This breaks some port builds.
>
> Example libfido2 (which is a dependency in the build of e.g. mysql):
> ---snip---
> [ 0% 4/1032] /usr/local/libexec/ccache/cc -DHAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
> -DHAVE_ASPRINTF -DHAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME -DHAVE_DEV_URANDOM -DHAVE_ENDIAN_H
> -DHAVE_ERR_H -DHAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO -DHAVE_GETLINE -DHAVE_GETOPT
> -DHAVE_GETPAGESIZE -DHAVE_GETRANDOM -DHAVE_OPENSSLV_H
> -DHAVE_READPASSPHRASE -DHAVE_SIGNAL_H -DHAVE_STRLCAT -DHAVE_STRLCPY
> -DHAVE_STRSEP -DHAVE_SYSCONF -DHAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H -DHAVE_TIMESPECSUB
> -DHAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP -DHAVE_UNISTD_H -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L
> -DTLS=__thread -D_FIDO_INTERNAL -D_FIDO_MAJOR=1 -D_FIDO_MINOR=14
> -D_FIDO_PATCH=0
> -I/wrkdirs/usr/ports/security/libfido2/work/libfido2-1.14.0/src
> -I/usr/local/include -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200809L -D_BSD_SOURCE
> -D__BSD_VISIBLE=1 -std=c99 -O2 -pipe -O2 -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize
> -O2 -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize -march=native
> -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L -fstack-protector-strong
> -fno-strict-aliasing -O2 -pipe -O2 -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize -O2
> -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize -march=native
> -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L -fstack-protector-strong
> -fno-strict-aliasing -DNDEBUG -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -fPIC -Wall -Wextra
> -Werror -Wshadow -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -Wmissing-prototypes
> -Wbad-function-cast -Wimplicit-fallthrough -pedantic -pedantic-errors
> -Wshorten-64-to-32 -fstack-protector-all -Wconversion -Wsign-conversion
> -Wframe-larger-than=2047 -MD -MT src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o -MF
> src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o.d -o
> src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o -c
> /wrkdirs/usr/ports/security/libfido2/work/libfido2-1.14.0/src/aes256.c
> FAILED: src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o
> /usr/local/libexec/ccache/cc -DHAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF -DHAVE_ASPRINTF
> -DHAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME -DHAVE_DEV_URANDOM -DHAVE_ENDIAN_H -DHAVE_ERR_H
> -DHAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO -DHAVE_GETLINE -DHAVE_GETOPT -DHAVE_GETPAGESIZE
> -DHAVE_GETRANDOM -DHAVE_OPENSSLV_H -DHAVE_READPASSPHRASE -DHAVE_SIGNAL_H
> -DHAVE_STRLCAT -DHAVE_STRLCPY -DHAVE_STRSEP -DHAVE_SYSCONF
> -DHAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H -DHAVE_TIMESPECSUB -DHAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
> -DHAVE_UNISTD_H -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L -DTLS=__thread
> -D_FIDO_INTERNAL -D_FIDO_MAJOR=1 -D_FIDO_MINOR=14 -D_FIDO_PATCH=0
> -I/wrkdirs/usr/ports/security/libfido2/work/libfido2-1.14.0/src
> -I/usr/local/include -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200809L -D_BSD_SOURCE
> -D__BSD_VISIBLE=1 -std=c99 -O2 -pipe -O2 -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize
> -O2 -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize -march=native
> -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L -fstack-protector-strong
> -fno-strict-aliasing -O2 -pipe -O2 -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize -O2
> -pipe -mtune=native -fvectorize -march=native
> -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L -fstack-protector-strong
> -fno-strict-aliasing -DNDEBUG -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -fPIC -Wall -Wextra
> -Werror -Wshadow -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -Wmissing-prototypes
> -Wbad-function-cast -Wimplicit-fallthrough -pedantic -pedantic-errors
> -Wshorten-64-to-32 -fstack-protector-all -Wconversion -Wsign-conversion
> -Wframe-larger-than=2047 -MD -MT src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o -MF
> src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o.d -o
> src/CMakeFiles/fido2.dir/aes256.c.o -c
> /wrkdirs/usr/ports/security/libfido2/work/libfido2-1.14.0/src/aes256.c
> /wrkdirs/usr/ports/security/libfido2/work/libfido2-1.14.0/src/aes256.c:18:2: error: use of GNU statement expression extension from macro expansion [-Werror,-Wgnu-statement-expression-from-macro-expansion]
> 18 | memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
> | ^
> /usr/include/ssp/string.h:120:5: note: expanded from macro 'memset'
> 120 | __ssp_bos_check3_typed(memset, void *, dst, int, val, len)
> | ^
> /usr/include/ssp/string.h:65:5: note: expanded from macro
> '__ssp_bos_check3_typed'
> 65 | __ssp_bos_check3_typed_var(fun, dsttype, __ssp_var(dstv),
> dst, \
> | ^
> /usr/include/ssp/string.h:54:24: note: expanded from macro
> '__ssp_bos_check3_typed_var'
> 54 | src, lenvar, len) ({ \
> | ^
> /wrkdirs/usr/ports/security/libfido2/work/libfido2-1.14.0/src/aes256.c:60:2: error: use of GNU statement expression extension from macro expansion [-Werror,-Wgnu-statement-expression-from-macro-expansion]
> 60 | memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
> | ^
> /usr/include/ssp/string.h:120:5: note: expanded from macro 'memset'
> 120 | __ssp_bos_check3_typed(memset, void *, dst, int, val, len)
> | ^
> /usr/include/ssp/string.h:65:5: note: expanded from macro
> '__ssp_bos_check3_typed'
> 65 | __ssp_bos_check3_typed_var(fun, dsttype, __ssp_var(dstv),
> dst, \
> | ^
> /usr/include/ssp/string.h:54:24: note: expanded from macro
> '__ssp_bos_check3_typed_var'
> 54 | src, lenvar, len) ({ \
> | ^
> ---snip---
>
> I also have a failed archivers/libdeflate, devel/highway, www/node20,
> and lang/rust, but those complain about something which could also be
> attributed to some kind of interaction between my use of -fvectorize and
> the new fortify stuff. Example with libdeflate (the libdeflate update in
> ports is from March, and I had it compiled with -fvectorize successfully
> before the fortify stuff came in):
> ---snip---
> In file included from
> /wrkdirs/usr/ports/archivers/libdeflate/work/libdeflate-1.20/lib/x86/adler32_impl.h:93:
> /wrkdirs/usr/ports/archivers/libdeflate/work/libdeflate-1.20/lib/x86/adler32_template.h:197:21: error: always_inline function '_mm512_set1_epi8' requires target feature 'evex512', but would be inlined into function 'adler32_x86_avx512_vl512_vnni' that is compiled without support for 'evex512'
> 197 | const vec_t ones = VSET1_8(1);
> | ^
> ---snip---
> Note, my CPUs don't support evex512 or avx512 at all, the compile flags
> haven't changed, this version of the port is installed in multiple jails
> (since March 28), so there is a change in behavior since then. It may or
> may not be due to the fortify stuff.
>
> I will test without -fvectorize later, poudriere is still building
> ports, and I want to see if some other ports fail. Those 5 failed port
> builds result in 160 skipped ports already (out of the >600 which this
> run wants to build).
>
> Maybe you want to backout and request an exp-build to not get swamped
> with failure reports from various people...
>
There's really not that much that can go wrong here; I looked at
enabling the warning in question in base to try and avoid future
landmines, but that results in an absolute dumpster fire so I guess we
won't do that.
Can you try this patch, please? https://termbin.com/jdtv -- it's the
apparently proper way to avoid the warning.
Thanks,
Kyle Evans