[Bug 261306] Geli rc.d script does not support insertion of USB devices containing a keyfile.
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Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 13:53:14 UTC
https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=261306 Bug ID: 261306 Summary: Geli rc.d script does not support insertion of USB devices containing a keyfile. Product: Base System Version: CURRENT Hardware: Any OS: Any Status: New Severity: Affects Some People Priority: --- Component: misc Assignee: bugs@FreeBSD.org Reporter: james@elstone.net Created attachment 231128 --> https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/attachment.cgi?id=231128&action=edit patch for /etc/rc.d/geli to enable waiting and very early mounting of a USB storage device Outline - ========== The script /etc/rc.d/geli does not support usb flash devices which either have a hardware pin or are inserted during system boot process. This will allow users to have a removable USB device with keyfiles on to be used by the _user-land_ geli service that is not stored in /boot/ or another fixed disk on the system. This would allow the security of key management to be increased. The attached (git) patch provides a: 1) Pause for a defined number of seconds for the user to insert a predefined USB storage device. 2) Early mounting of an inserted USB device that contains a keyfile, but just for geli. This can then be used in the geli_*_flags rcvar as a referenced key file. The device is unmounted after Geli has used it, so not to impact later boot stages. Detail - ======== This is a change to the /etc/rc.d/geli script, see attached diff. Both the EFI loader and kernel boot process resets all USB devices as they are enumerated, as expected. If you are using a USB storage device that requires a manual pin to be entered before it is available (i.e. hardware pin entered on the USB storage device, e.g. iStorage DataShur) it is very difficult to get a consistent boot without it erroring and entering single user mode. This change would also allow the late (prior to geli being called in the init process) insertion of any USB storage device for keyfile storage purposes. This would allow a practical end-user mechanism that would increase the system security as the keyfile is stored on an external and physically separate device of the users choice. Each time the USB bus is enumerated the USB device is reset and in effect a pin based storage device is locked by this, as expected, but cannot be used due to the time it takes to enter a pin on the device. Example Usage - =============== /etc/rc.conf: geli_secdevusb_device="/dev/gpt/security_key" geli_secdevusb_path="/security_key" geli_secdevusb_wait="120" geli_secdevusb_options="" where: - "/dev/gpt/security_key" is a gpart label for a UFS partition on a memory stick, or any other removable device that can be inserted and then mounted using mount(8). - /security_keys is a directory that the USB device should be mounted on, and can be referenced in the geli_*_flags variables in rc.conf. Setup for testing - =================== da0 is a fixed disk being encrypted, and da1 is a removable usb storage device contianing the keyfile. Warning: These test instructions are destructive to the example devices, read first and adapt for your system; also make sure you have backed up any critical data encrypted or not for da0 and da1. #create security key mkdir /security_key gpart create -s gpt /dev/da1 gpart add -a 1m -freebsd-ufs -l security_key /dev/da1 newfs /dev/da1p1 mount /dev/gpt/security_key /security_key mkdir /security_key/geli dd if=/dev/random of=/security_key/geli/DISK-ID0.key bs=64 count=1 #create encrypted volume with geli gpart create -s gpt /dev/da0 gpart add -a 1m -freebsd-zfs -l DISK-ID0 /dev/da0 geli init -s 4096 -B none -K "/security_keys/DISK-ID0.key" "/dev/gpt/DISK-ID0" #update rc.conf variables sysrc geli_secdevusb_device="/dev/gpt/security_key" sysrc geli_secdevusb_path="/security_key" sysrc geli_secdevusb_wait="120" sysrc geli_secdevusb_options="" sysrc geli_gpt_DISK_ID0_flags="-k /security_key/geli/DISK-ID0.key" #remove USB device that is da1 and reboot reboot #When prompted inset USB storage device that is da1 and enter the passphrase used with the geli init command above. RC Vars - ========= There are four new RC vars needed: sysrc geli_secdevusb_device="" sysrc geli_secdevusb_path="" sysrc geli_secdevusb_wait="" sysrc geli_secdevusb_options="" The default rcvars should be as follows to prevent the code from operating unless the user requires: geli_secdevusb_device="" geli_secdevusb_path="" geli_secdevusb_wait="0" geli_secdevusb_options="" Reasoning ========= I maybe reinventing the wheel here, but have explored the /boot/loader.conf vars geli_*_name, and geli_*_flags in /etc/rc.conf, but does not cover this use case. Most of the examples online refer to putting the keys into /boot/ which is not a strong security practice IMO as you are storing the key and the encrypted data in the same machine. I think this covers a use case not currently supported by FreeBSD, and is an improvement to have removable keyfiles on a usb device, and would like to help other users to reduce their security footprint. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are the assignee for the bug.