git: e2e771deeca7 - main - socket: Pass capsicum rights down to socket option handlers
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Date: Mon, 08 Jul 2024 16:10:56 UTC
The branch main has been updated by markj: URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=e2e771deeca7c10eaa46f380a9b64079468ec209 commit e2e771deeca7c10eaa46f380a9b64079468ec209 Author: Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org> AuthorDate: 2024-07-08 15:46:33 +0000 Commit: Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org> CommitDate: 2024-07-08 16:10:48 +0000 socket: Pass capsicum rights down to socket option handlers One needs the CAP_GETSOCKOPT and CAP_SETSOCKOPT rights to call getsockopt(2) and setsockopt(2) on a socket descriptor, respectively. The syscall layer checks this, but individual socket option handlers have no access to the file descriptor and so can't check for additional rights, should the want to do so. In particular, a forthcoming implementation of SO_SPLICE logically requires at least CAP_RECV and CAP_SEND rights. Modify the syscall layer to look up Capsicum rights on the descriptor and pass that along to socket option handlers; this way, the handlers can check for additional rights if they need to. Reviewed by: gallatin, glebius MFC after: 2 weeks Sponsored by: Klara, Inc. Sponsored by: Stormshield Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D45673 --- sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c | 9 +++++++-- sys/sys/sockopt.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c b/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c index 318415245ab7..e0bb7ace92c6 100644 --- a/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c +++ b/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c @@ -1220,6 +1220,7 @@ kern_setsockopt(struct thread *td, int s, int level, int name, const void *val, { struct socket *so; struct file *fp; + struct filecaps fcaps; struct sockopt sopt; int error; @@ -1245,8 +1246,10 @@ kern_setsockopt(struct thread *td, int s, int level, int name, const void *val, } AUDIT_ARG_FD(s); - error = getsock(td, s, &cap_setsockopt_rights, &fp); + error = getsock_cap(td, s, &cap_setsockopt_rights, &fp, + &fcaps); if (error == 0) { + sopt.sopt_rights = &fcaps.fc_rights; so = fp->f_data; error = sosetopt(so, &sopt); fdrop(fp, td); @@ -1284,6 +1287,7 @@ kern_getsockopt(struct thread *td, int s, int level, int name, void *val, { struct socket *so; struct file *fp; + struct filecaps fcaps; struct sockopt sopt; int error; @@ -1309,8 +1313,9 @@ kern_getsockopt(struct thread *td, int s, int level, int name, void *val, } AUDIT_ARG_FD(s); - error = getsock(td, s, &cap_getsockopt_rights, &fp); + error = getsock_cap(td, s, &cap_getsockopt_rights, &fp, &fcaps); if (error == 0) { + sopt.sopt_rights = &fcaps.fc_rights; so = fp->f_data; error = sogetopt(so, &sopt); *valsize = sopt.sopt_valsize; diff --git a/sys/sys/sockopt.h b/sys/sys/sockopt.h index 0b3d0d5ed08c..6cc8875a2665 100644 --- a/sys/sys/sockopt.h +++ b/sys/sys/sockopt.h @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #error "no user-serviceable parts inside" #endif +struct cap_rights; struct thread; struct socket; @@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ struct sockopt { int sopt_name; /* third arg of [gs]etsockopt */ void *sopt_val; /* fourth arg of [gs]etsockopt */ size_t sopt_valsize; /* (almost) fifth arg of [gs]etsockopt */ + struct cap_rights *sopt_rights; /* Capsicum rights attached to the fd */ struct thread *sopt_td; /* calling thread or null if kernel */ };