git: 5f5e32f1b394 - main - pf: protect the rpool from races
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Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 09:30:58 UTC
The branch main has been updated by kp:
URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=5f5e32f1b3945087a687c5962071d3f46e34e1ff
commit 5f5e32f1b3945087a687c5962071d3f46e34e1ff
Author: Kristof Provost <kp@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2022-01-10 16:49:26 +0000
Commit: Kristof Provost <kp@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2022-01-14 09:30:33 +0000
pf: protect the rpool from races
The roundrobin pool stores its state in the rule, which could
potentially lead to invalid addresses being returned.
For example, thread A just executed PF_AINC(&rpool->counter) and
immediately afterwards thread B executes PF_ACPY(naddr, &rpool->counter)
(i.e. after the pf_match_addr() check of rpool->counter).
Lock the rpool with its own mutex to prevent these races. The
performance impact of this is expected to be low, as each rule has its
own lock, and the lock is also only relevant when state is being created
(so only for the initial packets of a connection, not for all traffic).
See also: https://redmine.pfsense.org/issues/12660
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 3 weeks
Sponsored by: Rubicon Communications, LLC ("Netgate")
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D33874
---
sys/net/pfvar.h | 1 +
sys/netpfil/pf/pf_ioctl.c | 4 ++++
sys/netpfil/pf/pf_lb.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sys/net/pfvar.h b/sys/net/pfvar.h
index 115ff5cd6d36..7794b8f849fe 100644
--- a/sys/net/pfvar.h
+++ b/sys/net/pfvar.h
@@ -551,6 +551,7 @@ struct pf_kpooladdr {
TAILQ_HEAD(pf_kpalist, pf_kpooladdr);
struct pf_kpool {
+ struct mtx mtx;
struct pf_kpalist list;
struct pf_kpooladdr *cur;
struct pf_poolhashkey key;
diff --git a/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_ioctl.c b/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_ioctl.c
index f5612f6d0084..20bf8943e774 100644
--- a/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_ioctl.c
+++ b/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_ioctl.c
@@ -1542,6 +1542,8 @@ pf_krule_free(struct pf_krule *rule)
counter_u64_free(rule->states_cur);
counter_u64_free(rule->states_tot);
counter_u64_free(rule->src_nodes);
+
+ mtx_destroy(&rule->rpool.mtx);
free(rule, M_PFRULE);
}
@@ -1999,6 +2001,8 @@ pf_ioctl_addrule(struct pf_krule *rule, uint32_t ticket,
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(ruleset->rules[rs_num].inactive.ptr,
rule, entries);
ruleset->rules[rs_num].inactive.rcount++;
+
+ mtx_init(&rule->rpool.mtx, "pf_krule_pool", NULL, MTX_DEF);
PF_RULES_WUNLOCK();
return (0);
diff --git a/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_lb.c b/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_lb.c
index 26fe17a9c3b4..3803ff27a111 100644
--- a/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_lb.c
+++ b/sys/netpfil/pf/pf_lb.c
@@ -374,36 +374,45 @@ pf_map_addr(sa_family_t af, struct pf_krule *r, struct pf_addr *saddr,
return (0);
}
+ mtx_lock(&rpool->mtx);
/* Find the route using chosen algorithm. Store the found route
in src_node if it was given or found. */
- if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_NOROUTE)
+ if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_NOROUTE) {
+ mtx_unlock(&rpool->mtx);
return (1);
+ }
if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_DYNIFTL) {
switch (af) {
#ifdef INET
case AF_INET:
if (rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_acnt4 < 1 &&
(rpool->opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) !=
- PF_POOL_ROUNDROBIN)
+ PF_POOL_ROUNDROBIN) {
+ mtx_unlock(&rpool->mtx);
return (1);
- raddr = &rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_addr4;
- rmask = &rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_mask4;
+ }
+ raddr = &rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_addr4;
+ rmask = &rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_mask4;
break;
#endif /* INET */
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
if (rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_acnt6 < 1 &&
(rpool->opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) !=
- PF_POOL_ROUNDROBIN)
+ PF_POOL_ROUNDROBIN) {
+ mtx_unlock(&rpool->mtx);
return (1);
+ }
raddr = &rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_addr6;
rmask = &rpool->cur->addr.p.dyn->pfid_mask6;
break;
#endif /* INET6 */
}
} else if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_TABLE) {
- if ((rpool->opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) != PF_POOL_ROUNDROBIN)
+ if ((rpool->opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) != PF_POOL_ROUNDROBIN) {
+ mtx_unlock(&rpool->mtx);
return (1); /* unsupported */
+ }
} else {
raddr = &rpool->cur->addr.v.a.addr;
rmask = &rpool->cur->addr.v.a.mask;
@@ -467,27 +476,6 @@ pf_map_addr(sa_family_t af, struct pf_krule *r, struct pf_addr *saddr,
{
struct pf_kpooladdr *acur = rpool->cur;
- /*
- * XXXGL: in the round-robin case we need to store
- * the round-robin machine state in the rule, thus
- * forwarding thread needs to modify rule.
- *
- * This is done w/o locking, because performance is assumed
- * more important than round-robin precision.
- *
- * In the simpliest case we just update the "rpool->cur"
- * pointer. However, if pool contains tables or dynamic
- * addresses, then "tblidx" is also used to store machine
- * state. Since "tblidx" is int, concurrent access to it can't
- * lead to inconsistence, only to lost of precision.
- *
- * Things get worse, if table contains not hosts, but
- * prefixes. In this case counter also stores machine state,
- * and for IPv6 address, counter can't be updated atomically.
- * Probably, using round-robin on a table containing IPv6
- * prefixes (or even IPv4) would cause a panic.
- */
-
if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_TABLE) {
if (!pfr_pool_get(rpool->cur->addr.p.tbl,
&rpool->tblidx, &rpool->counter, af))
@@ -511,6 +499,7 @@ pf_map_addr(sa_family_t af, struct pf_krule *r, struct pf_addr *saddr,
/* table contains no address of type 'af' */
if (rpool->cur != acur)
goto try_next;
+ mtx_unlock(&rpool->mtx);
return (1);
}
} else if (rpool->cur->addr.type == PF_ADDR_DYNIFTL) {
@@ -520,6 +509,7 @@ pf_map_addr(sa_family_t af, struct pf_krule *r, struct pf_addr *saddr,
/* table contains no address of type 'af' */
if (rpool->cur != acur)
goto try_next;
+ mtx_unlock(&rpool->mtx);
return (1);
}
} else {
@@ -539,6 +529,8 @@ pf_map_addr(sa_family_t af, struct pf_krule *r, struct pf_addr *saddr,
if (*sn != NULL)
PF_ACPY(&(*sn)->raddr, naddr, af);
+ mtx_unlock(&rpool->mtx);
+
if (V_pf_status.debug >= PF_DEBUG_NOISY &&
(rpool->opts & PF_POOL_TYPEMASK) != PF_POOL_NONE) {
printf("pf_map_addr: selected address ");