git: f93a50d69df2 - main - fusefs: fix an uninitialized memory access in fuse_vnop_deallocate
- Go to: [ bottom of page ] [ top of archives ] [ this month ]
Date: Sun, 08 Sep 2024 21:57:22 UTC
The branch main has been updated by asomers: URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=f93a50d69df2e996ff1d4f793d0dcb9de655ebdc commit f93a50d69df2e996ff1d4f793d0dcb9de655ebdc Author: Alan Somers <asomers@FreeBSD.org> AuthorDate: 2024-09-08 21:50:40 +0000 Commit: Alan Somers <asomers@FreeBSD.org> CommitDate: 2024-09-08 21:50:40 +0000 fusefs: fix an uninitialized memory access in fuse_vnop_deallocate If the FUSE_GETATTR issued to query a file's size during fuse_vnop_deallocate failed for any reason, then fuse_vnop_deallocate would attempt to destroy an uninitialized fuse_dispatcher struct, with a crash the likely result. This bug only affects FUSE file systems that implement FUSE_FALLOCATE, and is unlikely to be seen on those that don't disable attribute caching. Reported by: Coverity Scan CID: 1505308 MFC after: 2 weeks --- sys/fs/fuse/fuse_vnops.c | 2 +- tests/sys/fs/fusefs/fallocate.cc | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_vnops.c b/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_vnops.c index bf272ab706da..30993441bd72 100644 --- a/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_vnops.c +++ b/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_vnops.c @@ -3075,8 +3075,8 @@ fuse_vnop_deallocate(struct vop_deallocate_args *ap) false); } -out: fdisp_destroy(&fdi); +out: if (closefufh) fuse_filehandle_close(vp, fufh, curthread, cred); diff --git a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/fallocate.cc b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/fallocate.cc index ff5e3eb4f4bb..a05760207648 100644 --- a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/fallocate.cc +++ b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/fallocate.cc @@ -310,6 +310,57 @@ TEST_F(Fspacectl, erofs) leak(fd); } +/* + * If FUSE_GETATTR fails when determining the size of the file, fspacectl + * should fail gracefully. This failure mode is easiest to trigger when + * attribute caching is disabled. + */ +TEST_F(Fspacectl, getattr_fails) +{ + const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt"; + const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt"; + Sequence seq; + struct spacectl_range rqsr; + const uint64_t ino = 42; + const uint64_t fsize = 2000; + int fd; + + expect_lookup(RELPATH, ino, S_IFREG | 0644, fsize, 1, 0); + expect_open(ino, 0, 1); + EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process( + ResultOf([](auto in) { + return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_GETATTR && + in.header.nodeid == ino); + }, Eq(true)), + _) + ).Times(1) + .InSequence(seq) + .WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([](auto i __unused, auto& out) { + SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, attr); + out.body.attr.attr.ino = ino; + out.body.attr.attr.mode = S_IFREG | 0644; + out.body.attr.attr.size = fsize; + out.body.attr.attr_valid = 0; + }))); + EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process( + ResultOf([](auto in) { + return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_GETATTR && + in.header.nodeid == ino); + }, Eq(true)), + _) + ).InSequence(seq) + .WillOnce(ReturnErrno(EIO)); + + fd = open(FULLPATH, O_RDWR); + ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno); + rqsr.r_offset = 500; + rqsr.r_len = 1000; + EXPECT_EQ(-1, fspacectl(fd, SPACECTL_DEALLOC, &rqsr, 0, NULL)); + EXPECT_EQ(EIO, errno); + + leak(fd); +} + TEST_F(Fspacectl, ok) { const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_file.txt";